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Abstract—This paper provides a comprehensive survey of Machine Learning Testing (ML testing) research. It covers 128 papers on
testing properties (e.g., correctness, robustness, and fairness), testing components (e.g., the data, learning program, and framework),
testing workflow (e.g., test generation and test evaluation), and application scenarios (e.g., autonomous driving, machine translation).
The paper also analyses trends concerning datasets, research trends, and research focus, concluding with research challenges and
promising research directions in ML testing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The prevalent applications of machine learning arouse
natural concerns about trustworthiness. Safety-critical ap-
plications such as self-driving systems [1], [2] and medical
treatments [3], increase the importance of behaviour relating
to correctness, robustness, privacy, efficiency and fairness.
Software testing refers to any activity that aims to detect
the differences between existing and required behaviour [4].
With recently rapid rise in interest and activity, testing
has been demonstrated to be an effective way to expose
problems and potentially facilitate to improve the trustwor-
thiness of machine learning systems.
For example, DeepXplore [1], a differential white-box
testing technique for deep learning, revealed thousands of
incorrect corner case behaviours in autonomous driving
learning systems; Themis [5], a fairness testing technique
for detecting causal discrimination, detected significant ML
model discrimination towards gender, marital status, or race
for as many as 77.2% of the individuals in datasets.
In fact, some aspects of the testing problem for machine
learning systems are shared with well-known solutions
already widely studied in the software engineering literat-
ure. Nevertheless, the statistical nature of machine learning
systems and their ability to make autonomous decisions
raise additional, and challenging, research questions for
software testing [6], [7].
Machine learning testing poses challenges that arise
from the fundamentally different nature and construction
of machine learning systems, compared to traditional (rel-
atively more deterministic and less statistically-orientated)
software systems. For instance, a machine learning system
inherently follows a data-driven programming paradigm
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where the decision logic is obtained via a training procedure
from training data under the machine learning algorithm’s
architecture [8]. The model’s behaviour may evolve over
time, in response to the frequent provision of new data [8].
While this is also true of traditional software systems, the
core underlying behaviour of a traditional system does not
typically change in response to new data, in the way that a
machine learning system can.
Testing machine learning also suffers from a particularly
pernicious instance of the Oracle Problem [9]. Machine learn-
ing systems are difficult to test because they are designed
to provide an answer to a question for which no previous
answer exists [10]. As Davis and Weyuker say [11], for
these kinds of systems ‘There would be no need to write
such programs, if the correct answer were known’. Much
of the literature on testing machine learning systems seeks
to find techniques that can tackle the Oracle problem, often
drawing on traditional software testing approaches.
The behaviours of interest for machine learning systems
are also typified by emergent properties, the effects of which
can only be fully understood by considering the machine
learning system as a whole. This makes testing harder,
because it is less obvious how to break the system into
smaller components that can be tested, as units, in isolation.
From a testing point of view, this emergent behaviour has
a tendency to migrate testing challenges from the unit
level to the integration and system level. For example, low
accuracy/precision of a machine learning model is typically
a composite effect, arising from a combination of the be-
haviours of different components such as the training data,
the learning program, and even the learning framework/lib-
rary [8].
Errors may propagate to become amplified or sup-
pressed, inhibiting the tester’s ability to decide where the
fault lies. These challenges also apply in more traditional
software systems, where, for example, previous work has
considered failed error propagation [12], [13] and the sub-
tleties introduced by fault masking [14], [15]. However,
these problems are far-reaching in machine learning sys-
tems, since they arise out of the nature of the machine
learning approach and fundamentally affect all behaviours,
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2rather than arising as a side effect of traditional data and
control flow [8].
For these reasons, machine learning systems are thus
sometimes regarded as ‘non-testable’ software. Rising to
these challenges, the literature has seen considerable pro-
gress and a notable upturn in interest and activity: Figure 1
shows the cumulative number of publications on the topic
of testing machine learning systems between 2007 and June
2019. From this figure, we can see that 85% of papers
have appeared since 2016, testifying to the emergence of
new software testing domain of interest: machine learning
testing.
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Figure 1: Machine Learning Testing Publications (accumu-
lative) during 2007-2019
In this paper, we use the term ‘Machine Learning Test-
ing’ (ML testing) to refer to any activity aimed at detect-
ing differences between existing and required behaviours
of machine learning systems. ML testing is different from
testing approaches that use machine learning or those that
are guided by machine learning, which should be referred
to as ‘machine learning-based testing’. This nomenclature
accords with previous usages in the software engineering
literature. For example, the literature uses the terms ‘state-
based testing’ [16] and ‘search-based testing’ [17], [18] to
refer to testing techniques that make use of concepts of state
and search space, whereas we use the terms ‘GUI testing’
[19] and ‘unit testing’ [20] to refer to test techniques that
tackle challenges of testing GUIs (Graphical User Interfaces)
and code units.
This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive survey
of ML testing. We draw together the aspects of previous
work that specifically concern software testing, while sim-
ultaneously covering all types of approaches to machine
learning that have hitherto been tackled using testing. The
literature is organised according to four different aspects:
the testing properties (such as correctness, robustness, and
fairness), machine learning components (such as the data,
learning program, and framework), testing workflow (e.g.,
test generation, test execution, and test evaluation), and ap-
plication scenarios (e.g., autonomous driving and machine
translation). Some papers address multiple aspects. For such
papers, we mention them in all the aspects correlated (in
different sections). This ensures that each aspect is complete.
Additionally, we summarise research distribution (e.g.,
among testing different machine learning categories),
trends, and datasets. We also identify open problems and
challenges for the emerging research community working
at the intersection between techniques for software testing
and problems in machine learning testing. To ensure that
our survey is self-contained, we aimed to include sufficient
material to fully orientate software engineering researchers
who are interested in testing and curious about testing
techniques for machine learning applications. We also seek
to provide machine learning researchers with a complete
survey of software testing solutions for improving the trust-
worthiness of machine learning systems.
There has been previous work that discussed or sur-
veyed aspects of the literature related to ML testing. Hains et
al. [21], Ma et al. [22], and Huang et al. [23] surveyed secure
deep learning, in which the focus was deep learning security
with testing as one aspect of guarantee techniques. Masuda
et al. [24] outlined their collected papers on software quality
for machine learning applications in a short paper. Ishi-
kawa [25] discussed the foundational concepts that might
be used in any and all ML testing approaches. Braiek and
Khomh [26] discussed defect detection in machine learning
data and/or models in their review of 39 papers. As far as
we know, no previous work has provided a comprehensive
survey particularly focused on machine learning testing.
In summary, the paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
1) Definition. The paper defines Machine Learning Test-
ing (ML testing), overviewing the concepts, testing work-
flow, testing properties, and testing components related to
machine learning testing.
2) Survey. The paper provides a comprehensive sur-
vey of 128 machine learning testing papers, across various
publishing areas such as software engineering, artificial
intelligence, systems and networking, and data mining.
3) Analyses. The paper analyses and reports data on
the research distribution, datasets, and trends that charac-
terise the machine learning testing literature. We observed
a pronounced imbalance in the distribution of research
efforts: among the 128 papers we collected, over 110 of
them tackle supervised learning testing, three of them tackle
unsupervised learning testing, and only one paper tests re-
inforcement learning. Additionally, most of them (85) centre
around correctness and robustness, but only a few papers
test interpretability, privacy, or efficiency.
4) Horizons. The paper identifies challenges, open prob-
lems, and promising research directions for ML testing, with
the aim of facilitating and stimulating further research.
Figure 2 depicts the paper structure. More details of the
review schema can be found in Section 4.
2 PRELIMINARIES OF MACHINE LEARNING
This section reviews the fundamental terminology in ma-
chine learning so as to make the survey self-contained.
Machine Learning (ML) is a type of artificial intelli-
gence technique that makes decisions or predictions from
data [27], [28]. A machine learning system is typically
composed from following elements or terms. Dataset: A set
of instances for building or evaluating a machine learning
model.
At the top level, the data could be categorised as:
• Training data: the data used to ‘teach’ (train) the al-
gorithm to perform its task.
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Figure 2: Tree structure of the contents in this paper
• Validation data: the data used to tune the hyper-
parameters of a learning algorithm.
• Test data: the data used to validate machine learning
model behaviour.
Learning program: the code written by developers to build
and validate the machine learning system.
Framework: the library, or platform being used when build-
ing a machine learning model, such as Pytorch [29], Tensor-
Flow [30], Scikit-learn [31], Keras [32], and Caffe [33].
In the remainder of this section, we give definitions for
other ML terminology used throughout the paper.
Instance: a piece of data recording the information about an
object.
Feature: a measurable property or characteristic of a phe-
nomenon being observed to describe the instances.
Label: value or category assigned to each data instance.
Test error: the difference ratio between the real conditions
and the predicted conditions.
Generalisation error: the expected difference ratio between
the real conditions and the predicted conditions of any valid
data.
Model: the learned machine learning artefact that encodes
decision or prediction logic which is trained from the train-
ing data, the learning program, and frameworks.
There are different types of machine learning. From the
perspective of training data characteristics, machine learn-
ing includes:
Supervised learning: a type of machine learning that learns
from training data with labels as learning targets. It is the
most widely used type of machine learning [34].
Unsupervised learning: a learning methodology that learns
from training data without labels and relies on understand-
ing the data itself.
Reinforcement learning: a type of machine learning where
the data are in the form of sequences of actions, observa-
tions, and rewards, and the learner learns how to take ac-
tions to interact in a specific environment so as to maximise
the specified rewards.
Let X = (x1, ..., xm) be the set of unlabelled training
data. Let Y = (c(x1), ..., c(xm)) be the set of labels cor-
responding to each piece of training data xi. Let concept
C : X → Y be the mapping from X to Y (the real pattern).
The task of supervised learning is to learn a mapping
pattern, i.e., a model, h based onX and Y so that the learned
model h is similar to its true concept C with a very small
generalisation error. The task of unsupervised learning is to
learn patterns or clusters from the data without knowing
the existence of labels Y . Reinforcement learning requires
a set of states S, actions A, a transition probability and a
reward probability. It learns how to take actions from A
under different S to get the best reward.
Machine learning can be applied to the following typical
tasks [28]:
1) classification: to assign a category to each data in-
stance; E.g., image classification, handwriting recognition.
2) regression: to predict a value for each data instance;
E.g., temperature/age/income prediction.
3) clustering: to partition instances into homogeneous
regions; E.g., pattern recognition, market/image segmenta-
tion.
4) dimension reduction: to reduce the training complex-
ity; E.g., dataset representation, data pre-processing.
5) control: to control actions to maximise rewards; E.g.,
game playing.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between different cat-
egories of machine learning and the five machine learning
tasks. Among the five tasks, classification and regression
belong to supervised learning; Clustering and dimension
reduction belong to unsupervised learning. Reinforcement
learning is widely adopted to control actions, such as to
control AI-game player to maximise the rewards for a game
agent.
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Figure 3: Machine learning categories and tasks
In addition, machine learning can be classified into clas-
sic machine learning and deep learning. Algorithms like
Decision Tree [35], SVM [27], linear regression [36], and
Naive Bayes [37] all belong to classic machine learning.
Deep learning [38] applies Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
that uses multiple layers of nonlinear processing uni s for
4feature extraction and transformation. Typical deep learning
algorithms often follow some widely used neural network
structures like Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [39]
and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) [40]. The scope of
this paper involves both classic machine learning and deep
learning.
3 MACHINE LEARNING TESTING
This section gives a definition and analyses of ML testing.
It describes the testing workflow (how to test), testing
properties (why to test), and testing components (where and
what to test).
3.1 Definition
A software bug refers to an imperfection in a computer
program that causes a discordance between the existing
and the required conditions [41]. In this paper, we refer the
term ‘bug’ to the differences between existing and required
behaviours of an ML system1.
Definition 1 (ML Bug). An ML bug refers to any imperfec-
tion in a machine learning item that causes a discordance
between the existing and the required conditions.
Having defined ML bugs, in this paper, we define ML
testing as the activities aimed to detect ML bugs.
Definition 2 (ML Testing). Machine Learning Testing (ML
testing) refers to any activities designed to reveal ma-
chine learning bugs.
The definitions of machine learning bugs and ML testing
indicate three aspects of machine learning: the required
conditions, the machine learning items, and the testing
activities. A machine learning system may have different
types of ‘required conditions’, such as correctness, robust-
ness, and privacy. An ML bug may exist in the data, the
learning program, or the framework. The testing activities
may include test input generation, test oracle identification,
test adequacy evaluation, and bug triage. In this survey, we
refer to the above three aspects as testing properties, testing
components, and testing workflow, respectively, according
to which we collect and organise the related work.
Note that a test input in ML testing can be much more
diverse in its form than that in traditional software testing,
due to the fact that not only the code may contain bugs, but
also the data. When we try to detect the bugs in data, one
may even use a toy training program as a test input to check
some must-to-hold data properties.
3.2 ML Testing Workflow
ML testing workflow is about how to conduct ML testing
with different testing activities. In this section, we first
briefly introduce the role of ML testing when building
ML models, then present the key procedures and activities
in ML testing. We introduce more details of the current
research related to each procedure in Section 5.
1 The existing related papers may use other terms like ‘defect’ or ‘issue’.
This paper uses ‘bug’ as a representative of all such related terms
considering that ‘bug’ has a more general meaning [41].
3.2.1 Role of Testing in ML Development
Figure 4 shows the life cycle of deploying a machine learn-
ing system with ML testing activities involved. At the very
beginning, a prototype model is generated based on his-
torical data; before deploying the model online, one needs
to conduct offline testing, such as cross-validation, to make
sure that the model meets the required conditions. After
deployment, the model makes predictions, yielding new
data that can be analysed via online testing to evaluate how
the model interacts with user behaviours.
There are several reasons that make online testing essen-
tial. First, offline testing usually relies on test data, while test
data usually fail to fully represent future data [42]; Second,
offline testing is not able to test some circumstances that
may be problematic in real applied scenarios, such as data
loss and call delays. In addition, offline testing has no access
to some business metrics such as open rate, reading time,
and click-through rate.
In the following, we present a ML testing workflow
adapted from classic software testing workflow. Figure 5
shows the workflow, including both offline testing and
online testing.
3.2.2 Offline Testing
The workflow of offline testing is shown by the top of
Figure 5. At the very beginning, developers need to conduct
requirement analysis to define the expectations of the users
for the machine learning system under test. In requirement
analysis, specifications of a machine learning system are
analysed and the whole testing procedure is planned. After
that, tests inputs are either sampled from the collected data
or generated somehow based on a specific purpose. Test
oracles are then identified or generated (see Section 5.2 for
more details of test oracles in machine learning). When the
tests are ready, they need to be executed for developers to
collect results. The test execution process involves building
a model with the tests (when the tests are training data) or
running a built model against the tests (when the tests are
test data), as well as checking whether the test oracles are
violated. After the process of test execution, developers may
use some evaluation metrics to check the quality of tests, i.e.,
the ability of the tests to expose ML problems.
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Figure 4: Role of ML testing in ML system development
The test execution results yield a bug report to help
developers duplicate, locate, and solve the bug. Those
identified bugs will be labelled with different severity and
assigned for different developers. Once the bug is debugged
and repaired, regression testing is conducted to make sure
the repair solves the reported problem and does not bring
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Figure 5: Workflow of ML testing
new problems. If no bugs are identified, the offline testing
process ends, and the model is deployed.
3.2.3 Online Testing
Offline testing tests the model with historical data without
in the real application environment. It also lacks the data
collection process of user behaviours. Online testing com-
plements the shortage of offline testing.
The workflow of online testing is shown by the bottom of
Figure 5. Usually the users are split into different groups to
conduct control experiments, to help find out which model
is better, or whether the new model is superior to the old
model under certain application contexts.
A/B testing is one of the key types of online testing of
machine learning to validate the deployed models [43]. It
is a splitting testing technique to compare two versions of
the systems (e.g., web pages) that involve customers. When
performing A/B testing on ML systems, the sampled users
will be split into two groups using the new and old ML
models separately.
MRB (Multi-Rrmed Bandit) is another online testing
approach [44]. It first conducts A/B testing for a short time
and finds out the best model, then put more resources on
the chosen model.
3.3 ML Testing Components
To build a machine learning model, an ML software de-
veloper usually needs to collect data, label the data, design
learning program architecture, and implement the proposed
architecture based on specific frameworks. The procedure of
machine learning model development requires interaction
with several components such as data, learning program,
and learning framework, while each component may con-
tain bugs.
Figure 6 shows the basic procedure of building an ML
model and the major components involved in the process.
Data are collected and pre-processed for use; Learning pro-
gram is the code for running to train the model; Framework
(e.g., Weka, scikit-learn, and TensorFlow) offers algorithms
and other libraries for developers to choose from when
writing the learning program.
Thus, when conducting ML testing, developers may
need to try to find bugs in every component including
the data, the learning program, and the framework. In
particular, error propagation is a more serious problem in
ML development because the components are more closely
bonded with each other than traditional software [8], which
indicates the importance of testing each of the ML compon-
ents. We introduce the bug detection in each ML component
in the following.
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in ML model building.
Bug Detection in Data. The behaviours of a machine learn-
ing system largely depends on data [8]. Bugs in data affect
the quality of the generated model, and can be amplified
to yield more serious problems over a period a time [45].
Bug detection in data checks problems such as whether
the data is sufficient for training or test a model (also
called completeness of the data [46]), whether the data is
representative of future data, whether the data contains a
lot of noise such as biased labels, whether there is skew
between training data and test data [45], and whether there
is data poisoning [47] or adversary information that may
affect the model’s performance.
Bug Detection in Frameworks. Machine Learning requires a
lot of computations. As shown by Figure 6, ML frameworks
offer algorithms to help write the learning program, and
platforms to help train the machine learning model, making
it easier for developers to build solutions for designing,
training and validating algorithms and models for com-
plex problems. They play a more important role in ML
development than in traditional software development. ML
Framework testing thus checks whether the frameworks of
6machine learning have bugs that may lead to problems in
the final system [48].
Bug Detection in Learning Program. A learning program
can be classified into two parts: the algorithm designed
by the developer or chosen from the framework, and the
actual code that developers write to implement, deploy, or
configure the algorithm. A bug in the learning program
may either because the algorithm is designed, chosen, or
configured improperly, or because the developers make
typos or errors when implementing the designed algorithm.
3.4 ML Testing Properties
Testing properties refer to why to test in ML testing: for
what conditions ML testing needs to guarantee for a trained
model. This section lists some properties that the literature
concern the most, including basic functional requirements
(i.e., correctness and overfitting degree) and non-functional
requirements (i.e., efficiency, robustness2, fairness, inter-
pretability).
These properties are not strictly independent with each
other when considering the root causes, yet they are dif-
ferent external performances of an ML system and deserve
being treated independently in ML testing.
3.4.1 Correctness
Correctness measures the probability that the ML system
under test ‘gets things right’.
Definition 3 (Correctness). Let D be the distribution of
future unknown data. Let x be a data item belonging
to D. Let h be the machine learning model that we are
testing. h(x) is the predicted label of x, c(x) is the true
label. The model correctness E(h) is the probability that
h(x) and c(x) are identical:
E(h) = Prx∼D[h(x) = c(x)] (1)
Achieving acceptable correctness is the fundamental re-
quirement of an ML system. The real performance of an
ML system should be evaluated on future data. Since future
data are often not available, the current best practice usually
splits the data into training data and test data (or training
data, validation data, and test data), and uses test data to
simulate future data. This data split approach is called cross-
validation.
Definition 4 (Empirical Correctness). Let X = (x1, ..., xm)
be the set of unlabelled test data sampled from D.
Let h be the machine learning model under test. Let
Y ′ = (h(x1), ..., h(xm)) be the set of predicted labels cor-
responding to each training item xi. Let Y = (y1, ..., ym)
be the true labels, where each yi ∈ Y corresponds to
the label of xi ∈ X . The empirical correctness of model
(denoted as Eˆ(h)) is:
Eˆ(h) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
I(h(xi) = yi) (2)
where I is the indicator function. A predicate returns 1 if p
is true, and returns 0 otherwise.
2 we adopt the more general understanding from software engineering
community [49], [50], and regard robustness as a non-functional re-
quirement.
3.4.2 Overfitting Degree
A machine learning model comes from the combination
of a machine learning algorithm and the training data. It
is important to ensure that the adopted machine learning
algorithm should be no more complex than just needed [51].
Otherwise, the model may fail to have good performance
and generalise to new data.
We define the problem of detecting whether the machine
learning algorithm’s capacity fits the data as the identific-
ation of Overfitting Degree. The capacity of the algorithm is
usually approximated by VC-dimension [52] or Rademacher
Complexity [53] for classification tasks.
Definition 5 (Overfitting Degree). Let D be the training
data distribution. Let R(D,A) be the simplest required
capacity of machine learning algorithm A. R′(D,A′) is
the capacity of the machine learning algorithm A′ under
test. The overfitting degree is the difference between
R(D,A) and R′(D,A′).
f = |(R(D,A)−R′(D,A′)| (3)
The overfitting degree aims to measure how much a
machine learning algorithm fails to fit future data or pre-
dict future observations reliably because it is ‘overfitted’ to
currently available training data.
The quantitative overfitting analysis of machine learning
is a challenging problem [42]. We discuss more strategies
that could help alleviate the problem of overfitting in Sec-
tion 6.2.
3.4.3 Robustness
Robustness is defined by the IEEE standard glossary of
software engineering terminology [54], [55] as: ‘The degree
to which a system or component can function correctly in
the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental
conditions’. Taking the similar spirit of this definition, we
define the robustness of ML as follows:
Definition 6 (Robustness). Let S be a machine learning
system. Let E(S) be the correctness of S. Let δ(S)
be the machine learning system with perturbations on
any machine learning components such as the data, the
learning program, or the framework. The robustness
of a machine learning system is a measurement of the
difference between E(S) and E(δ(S)):
r = E(S)− E(δ(S)) (4)
Robustness thus measures the resilience of an ML system
towards perturbations.
A popular sub-category of robustness is called adversarial
robustness. For adversarial robustness, the perturbations are
designed to be hard to detect. Referring to the work of
Katz et al. [56], we classify adversarial robustness into local
adversarial robustness and global adversarial robustness.
Local adversarial robustness is defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Local Adversarial Robustness). Let x a test
input for an ML model h. Let x′ be another test input
generated via conducting adversarial perturbation on x.
Model h is δ-local robust at input x if for any x′
∀x′ : ||x− x′||p≤ δ → h(x) = h(x′) (5)
7Local adversarial robustness concerns the robustness at
one specific test input, while global adversarial robustness
requests robustness against all inputs. We define global
adversarial robustness as follows.
Definition 8 (Global Adversarial Robustness). Let x a test
input for an ML model h. Let x′ be another test input
generated via conducting adversarial perturbation on x.
Model h is -global robust if for any x and x′
∀x, x′ : ||x− x′||p≤ δ → h(x)− h(x′) ≤  (6)
3.4.4 Security
Definition 9 (Security). The security of an ML system is
the system’s resilience against potential harm, danger,
or loss made via manipulating or illegally accessing ML
components.
Security and robustness are closely related. An ML sys-
tem with low robustness may be insecure: if it is less robust
in resisting the perturbations in the data to predict, the
system may be easy to suffer from adversarial attacks (i.e.,
fooling the ML system via generating adversarial examples,
which are special test inputs modified from original inputs
but look the same as original inputs to the humans); if it is
less robust in resisting the perturbations in the training data,
the system may be easy to suffer from data poisoning (i.e.,
change the predictive behaviour via modifying the training
data).
Nevertheless, low robustness is just one cause for high-
security risk. Except for perturbations attacks, security is-
sues also include other aspects such as model stealing or
extraction. This survey focuses on the testing techniques
on detecting ML security problems, which narrows the
security scope to robustness-related security. We combine
the introduction of robustness and security in Section 6.3.
3.4.5 Data Privacy
Machine learning is widely adopted to predict individual
habits or behaviours to maximise the benefits of many com-
panies. For example, Netflix offered a large dataset (with the
ratings of around 500,000 users) for an open competition
to predict user ratings for films. Nevertheless, sensitive
information about individuals in the training data can be
easily leaked. Even if the data is anonymised (i.e., to encrypt
or remove personally identifiable information from datasets
to keep the individual anonymous), there is a high risk
of linkage attack, which means the individual information
may still be recovered to some extent via linking the data
instances among different datasets.
We define privacy in machine learning as the ML sys-
tem’s ability to preserve private data information. For the
formal definition, we use the most popular differential privacy
taken from the work of Dwork [57].
Definition 10 (-Differential Privacy). Let A be a random-
ised algorithm. Let D1 and D2 be two training data sets
that differ only on one instance. Let S be a subset of the
output set of A. A gives -differential privacy if
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() ∗ Pr[A(D2) ∈ S] (7)
In other words, -Differential privacy ensures that the
learner should not get much more information fromD1 than
D2 when D1 than D2 differs in only one instance.
Data privacy has been regulated by The EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [58] and California
CCPA [59], make the protection of data privacy a hot re-
search topic. Nevertheless, the current research mainly focus
on data privacy is how to present privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning, instead of detecting privacy violations. We
discuss privacy-related research opportunities and research
directions in Section 10.
3.4.6 Efficiency
The efficiency of a machine learning system refers to its
construction or prediction speed. An efficiency problem
happens when the system executes slowly or even infinitely
during the construction or the prediction phase.
With the exponential growth of data and complexity of
systems, efficiency is an important feature to consider for
model selection and framework selection, sometimes even
more important than accuracy [60]. For example, given a
large VGG-19 model which hundreds of MB, to deploy
such a model to a mobile device, certain optimisation,
compression, and device-oriented customisation must be
performed to make it feasible for a mobile device execution
in a reasonable time, but the accuracy is often sacrificed.
3.4.7 Fairness
Machine learning is a statistical method and is widely
adopted to make decisions, such as income prediction and
medical treatment prediction. It learns what human beings
teach (i.e., in form of training data), while human beings
may have bias over cognition, further affecting the data
collected or labelled and the algorithm designed, leading to
bias issues. It is thus important to ensure that the decisions
made by a machine learning system are in the right way
and for the right reason, to avoid problems in human rights,
discrimination, law, and other ethical issues.
The characteristics that are sensitive and need to be
protected against unfairness are called protected character-
istics [61] or protected attributes and sensitive attributes. Ex-
amples of legally recognised protected classes include race,
colour, sex, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, preg-
nancy, familial status, disability status, veteran status, and
genetic information.
Fairness is often domain specific. Regulated domains
include credit, education, employment, housing, and public
accommodation3.
To formulate fairness is the first step to solve the fairness
problems and build fair machine learning models. The liter-
ature has proposed many definitions of fairness but no firm
consensus is reached at this moment. Considering that the
definitions themselves are the research focus of fairness in
machine learning, we discuss how the literature formulates
and measures different types of fairness in Section 6.5 in
details.
3 To prohibit discrimination ‘in a place of public accommodation on the
basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression’ [62].
83.4.8 Interpretability
Machine learning models are oftentimes applied to assist/-
make decisions in medical treatment, income prediction,
or personal credit assessment. It is essential for human
beings to understand the logic and reason behind the final
decisions made by some certain machine learning system, so
that human beings can build more trust over the decisions
made by ML to make it more socially acceptable, under-
stand the cause of decisions to avoid discrimination and get
more knowledge, transfer the models to other situations,
and avoid safety risks as much as possible [63], [64], [65].
The motives and definitions of interpretability are di-
verse and still discordant [63]. Nevertheless, unlike fairness,
a mathematical definition of ML interpretability remains
elusive [64]. Referring to the work of Biran and Cotton [66]
as well as the work of Miller [67], we define the interpretab-
ility of ML as follows.
Definition 11 (Interpretability). ML Interpretability refers
to the degree to which an observer can understand the
cause of a decision made by an ML system.
Interpretability contains two aspects: transparency (how
the model works) and post hoc explanations (other inform-
ation that could be derived from the model) [63]. Inter-
pretability is also regarded as a request by regulations like
GDPR [68], where the user has the legal ‘right to explana-
tion’ to ask for an explanation of an algorithmic decision that
was made about them. A thorough introduction of ML inter-
pretability can be referred to in the book of Christoph [69].
3.5 Software Testing vs. ML Testing
Traditional software testing and ML testing are different
in many aspects. To understand the unique features of
ML testing, we summarise the primary differences between
traditional software testing and ML testing in Table 1.
1) Component to test (where the bug may exist): traditional
software testing detects bugs in the code, while ML test-
ing detects bugs in the data, the learning program, and
the framework, each of which playing an essential role in
building an ML model.
2) Behaviours under test: the behaviours of traditional
software code are usually fixed once the requirement is
fixed, while the behaviours of an ML model may frequently
change as the update of training data.
3) Test input: the test inputs in traditional software testing
are usually the input data when testing code; in ML testing,
however, the test inputs in may have various forms and one
may need to use a piece of code as a test input to test the
data. Note that we separate the definition of ‘test input’ and
‘test data’. Test inputs in ML testing could be but not limited
to test data. When testing the learning program, a test case
may be a single test instance from the test data or a toy
training set; when testing the data, the test input could be a
learning program.
4) Test oracle: traditional software testing usually assumes
the presence of a test oracle. The output can be verified
against the expected values by the developer, and thus the
oracle is usually determined beforehand. Machine learning,
however, is used to generate answers based on a set of input
values, yet the answers are usually unknown. There would
be no need to write such programs, if the correct answer
were known’ as described by Davis and Weyuker [11]. Thus,
the oracles that could be adopted by ML testing are more
difficult to obtain and are usually some pseudo oracles such
as metamorphic relations [70].
5) Test adequacy criteria: test adequacy criteria are used
to provide quantitative measurement on the degree of the
target software is tested. Up to present, many adequacy cri-
teria are proposed and widely adopted in software industry,
e.g., line coverage, branch coverage, dataflow coverage.
However, due to the fundamental difference of program-
ming paradigm and logic representation format for machine
learning software and traditional software, new test ad-
equacy criteria are required so as to take the characteristics
of machine learning software into consideration.
6) False positives in detected bugs: due to the difficulty
in obtaining reliable oracles, ML testing tend to yield more
false positives in the reported bugs.
7) Roles of testers: the bugs in ML testing may exist not
only in the learning program, but also in the data or the
algorithm, and thus data scientists or algorithm designers
could also play the role of testers.
4 PAPER COLLECTION AND REVIEW SCHEMA
This section introduces the scope, the paper collection ap-
proach, an initial analysis of the collected papers, and the
organisation of our survey.
4.1 Survey Scope
An ML system may include both hardware and software.
The scope of our paper is software testing (as defined in the
introduction) applied to machine learning.
We apply the following inclusion criteria when collecting
papers. If a paper satisfies any one or more of the following
criteria, we will include it. When speaking of related ‘aspects
of ML testing’, we refer to the ML properties, ML compon-
ents, and ML testing procedure introduced in Section 2.
1) The paper introduces/discusses the general idea of ML
testing or one of the related aspects of ML testing.
2) The paper proposes an approach, study, or tool/frame-
work that targets testing one of the ML properties or com-
ponents.
3) The paper presents a dataset or benchmark especially
designed for the purpose of ML testing.
4) The paper introduces a set of measurement criteria that
could be adopted to test one of the ML properties.
Some papers concern traditional validation of ML model
performance such as the introduction of precision, recall,
and cross-validation. We do not include these papers be-
cause they have had a long research history and have been
thoroughly and maturely studied. Nevertheless, for com-
pleteness, we include the knowledge when introducing the
background to set the context. We do not include the papers
that adopt machine learning techniques for the purpose
of traditional software testing and also those target ML
problems, which do not use testing techniques as a solution.
9Table 1: Comparison between Traditional Software Testing and ML Testing
Characteristics Traditional Testing ML Testing
Component to test code data and code (learning program, framework)
Behaviour under test usually fixed change overtime
Test input input data data or code
Test oracle defined by developers unknown
Adequacy Criteria coverage/mutation score unknown
False positives in bugs rare prevalent
Tester developer data scientist, algorithm designer, developer
4.2 Paper Collection Methodology
To collect the papers across different research areas as much
as possible, we started by using exact keyword searching on
popular scientific databases including Google Scholar, DBLP
and arXiv one by one. The keywords used for searching
are listed below. [ML properties] means the set of ML
testing properties including correctness, overfitting degree,
robustness, efficiency, privacy, fairness, and interpretability.
We used each element in this set plus ‘test’ or ‘bug’ as
the search query. Similarly, [ML components] denotes the
set of ML components including data, learning program/-
code, and framework/library. Altogether, we conducted
(3 ∗ 3 + 6 ∗ 2 + 3 ∗ 2) ∗ 3 = 81 searches across the three
repositories before March 8, 2019.
• machine learning + test|bug|trustworthiness
• deep learning + test|bug|trustworthiness
• neural network + test|bug|trustworthiness
• [ML properties]+ test|bug
• [ML components]+ test|bug
Machine learning techniques have been applied in vari-
ous domains across different research areas. As a result,
authors may tend to use very diverse terms. To ensure a
high coverage of ML testing related papers, we therefore
also performed snowballing [71] on each of the related
papers found by keyword searching. We checked the related
work sections in these studies and continue adding the
related work that satisfies the inclusion criteria introduced
in Section 4.1, until we reached closure.
To ensure a more comprehensive and accurate survey,
we emailed the authors of the papers that were collected via
query and snowballing, and let them send us other papers
they are aware of which are related with machine learning
testing but have not been included yet. We also asked them
to check whether our description about their work in the
survey was accurate and correct.
4.3 Collection Results
Table 2 shows the details of paper collection results. The
papers collected from Google Scholar and arXiv turned out
to be subsets of from DBLP so we only present the results
of DBLP. Keyword search and snowballing resulted in 109
papers across six research areas till May 15th, 2019. We
received over 50 replies from all the cited authors until June
4th, 2019, and added another 19 papers when dealing with
the author feedback. Altogether, we collected 128 papers.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of papers published
in different research venues. Among all the papers, 37.5%
papers are published in software engineering venues such
as ICSE, FSE, ASE, ICST, and ISSTA; 11.7% papers are
Table 2: Paper Query Results
Key Words Hits Title Body
machine learning test 211 17 13
machine learning bug 28 4 4
machine learning trustworthiness 1 0 0
deep learning test 38 9 8
deep learning bug 14 1 1
deep learning trustworthiness 2 1 1
neural network test 288 10 9
neural network bug 22 0 0
neural network trustworthiness 5 1 1
[ML properties]+test 294 5 5
[ML properties]+bug 10 0 0
[ML components]+test 77 5 5
[ML components]+bug 8 2 2
Query - - 50
Snowball - - 59
Author feedback - - 19
Overall - - 128
published in systems and network venues; surprisingly,
only 13.3% of the total papers are published in artificial
intelligence venues such as AAAI, CVPR, and ICLR. Addi-
tionally, 25.0% of the papers have not yet been published via
peer-reviewed venues (the arXiv part). This distribution of
different venues indicates that ML testing is the most widely
published in software engineering venues, but with a wide
publishing venue diversity.
Artificial Intelligence
13.3%
arXiv
25.0%
Data Mining
5.5%
Others
4.7%
Systems and Network
11.7%
Software Engineering
37.5%
Figure 7: Publication Venue Distribution
4.4 Paper Organisation
We present the literature review from two aspects: 1) a
literature review of the collected papers, 2) a statistical
analysis of the collected papers, datasets, and tools, The
sections and the corresponding contents are presented in
Table 3.
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Table 3: Review Schema
Classification Sec Topic
Testing Workflow
5.1 Test Input Generation
5.2 Test Oracle Identification
5.3 Test Adequacy Evaluation
5.4 Test Prioritisation and Reduction
5.5 Bug Report Analysis
5.6 Debug and Repair
Testing Properties
6.1 Correctness
6.2 Overfitting
6.3 Robustness and Security
6.4 Efficiency
6.5 Fairness
6.6 Interpretability
Testing Components
7.1 Bug Detection in Data
7.2 Bug Detection in Program
7.3 Bug Detection in Framework
Application Scenario
8.1 Autonomous Driving
8.2 Machine Translation
8.3 Natural Language Inference
Summary&Analysis 9.1 Timeline9.2 Analysis of Categories
9.3 Analysis of Properties
9.4 Dataset
9.5 Open-source Tool Support
1) Literature Review. The papers in our collection are
organised and presented from four angles. We introduce
the work about different testing workflow in Section 5. In
Section 6 we classify the papers based on the ML problems
they target, including functional properties like correctness
and overfitting degree and non-functional properties like
robustness, fairness, privacy, and interpretability. Section 7
introduces the testing technologies on detecting bugs in
data, learning programs, and ML frameworks, libraries,
or platforms. Section 8 introduces the testing techniques
applied in particular application scenarios such as autonom-
ous driving and machine translation.
We’d like to strengthen that the four aspects have dif-
ferent focuses of ML testing, each of which is a complete
organisation of the total collected papers (see more discus-
sion in Section 3.1). That is to say, for one ML testing paper,
it may fit multiple aspects if being viewed from different
angles. For such a kind of paper, we fit it into one or more
sections wherever applicable.
2) Statistical Analysis and Summary. We analyse and
compare the number of research papers on different ma-
chine learning categories (supervised/unsupervised/rein-
forcement learning), machine learning structures (clas-
sic/deep learning), testing properties in Section 9. We also
summarise the datasets and tools adopted so far in ML
testing.
The four different angles of presenting the related work
as well as the statistical summary, analysis, and comparison,
enable us to observe the research focus, trend, challenges,
opportunities, and directions of ML testing. These contents
are presented in Section 10.
5 ML TESTING WORKFLOW
This section organises ML testing research based on the
testing workflow as shown by Figure 5.
ML testing includes offline testing and online testing,
the current research centres around offline testing. The pro-
cedures that are not covered based on our paper collection,
such as requirement analysis and regression testing and
those belonging to online testing are discussed as research
opportunities in Section 10.
5.1 Test Input Generation
We organise the test input generation research based on the
techniques they adopt.
5.1.1 Domain-specific Test Input Synthesis
Test inputs of ML testing can be classified into two cat-
egories: adversarial inputs and natural inputs. Adversarial
inputs are perturbed based on the original inputs. They may
not belong to normal data distribution (i.e., maybe rarely
exist in practice), but could expose robustness or security
flaws. Natural inputs, instead, are those inputs that belong
to the data distribution of a practical application scenario.
Here we introduce the related work that aims to generate
natural inputs via domain-specific test input synthesis.
DeepXplore [1] proposed a white-box differential testing
technique to generate test inputs for a deep learning system.
Inspired by test coverage in traditional software testing, the
authors proposed neuron coverage to drive test generation
(we discuss different coverage criteria for ML testing in
Section 5.2.3). The test inputs are expected to have high
neuron coverage. Additionally, the inputs need to expose
differences among different DNN models, as well as be like
real-world data as much as possible. The joint optimisation
algorithm iteratively uses a gradient search to find a modi-
fied input that satisfies all of these goals. The evaluation of
DeepXplore indicates that it covers 34.4% and 33.2% more
neurons than the same number of randomly picked inputs
and adversarial inputs.
To create useful and effective data for autonomous
driving systems, DeepTest [72] performed greedy search
with nine different realistic image transformations: chan-
ging brightness, changing contrast, translation, scaling, ho-
rizontal shearing, rotation, blurring, fog effect, and rain
effect. There are three types of image transformation styles
provided in OpenCV4: linear, affine, and convolutional. The
evaluation of DeepTest uses the Udacity self-driving car
challenge dataset [73]. It detected more than 1,000 erroneous
behaviours on CNNs and RNNs with low false positive
rates5.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [74] are al-
gorithms to generate models that approximate the mani-
folds and distribution on a given set of data. GAN has
been successfully applied to advanced image transforma-
tion (e.g., style transformation, scene transformation) that
look at least superficially authentic to human observers.
Zhang et al. [75] applied GAN to deliver driving scene-
based test generation with various weather conditions. They
4 https://github.com/itseez/opencv(2015)
5 The examples of detected erroneous behaviours are available at https:
//deeplearningtest.github.io/deepTest/.
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sampled images from Udacity Challenge dataset [73] and
YouTube videos (snowy or rainy scenes), and fed them into
UNIT framework6 for training. The trained model takes
the whole Udacity images as the seed inputs and yield
transformed images as generated tests.
Zhou et al. [77] proposed DeepBillboard to generate real-
world adversarial billboards that can trigger potential steer-
ing errors of autonomous driving systems.
To test audio-based deep learning systems, Du et al. [78]
designed a set of transformations tailored to audio in-
puts considering background noise and volume variation.
They first abstracted and extracted a probabilistic transition
model from an RNN. Based on this, stateful testing criteria
are defined and used to guide test generation for stateful
machine learning system.
To test the image classification platform when classify-
ing biological cell images, Ding et al. [79] built a testing
framework for biological cell classifiers. The framework
iteratively generates new images and uses metamorphic
relations for testing. For example, they generate new images
by adding new or increasing the number/shape of artificial
mitochondrion into the biological cell images, which can
arouse easy-to-identify changes in the classification results.
5.1.2 Fuzz and Search-based Test Input Generation
Fuzz testing is a traditional automatic testing technique that
generates random data as program inputs to detect crashes,
memory leaks, failed (built-in) assertions, etc, with many
sucessfully application to system security and vulnerability
detection [9]. As another widely used test generation tech-
nique, search-based test generation often uses metaheuristic
search techniques to guide the fuzz process for more ef-
ficient and effective test generation [17], [80], [81]. These
two techniques have also been proved to be effective in
exploring the input space of ML testing:
Odena et al. [82] presented TensorFuzz. TensorFuzz used a
simple nearest neighbour hill climbing approach to explore
achievable coverage over valid input space for Tensorflow
graphs, and to discover numerical errors, disagreements
between neural networks and their quantized versions, and
surfacing undesirable behaviour in RNNs.
DLFuzz, proposed by Guo et al. [83], is another fuzz test
generation tool based on the implementation of DeepXplore
with nueron coverage as guidance. DLFuzz aims to generate
adversarial examples. The generation process thus does not
require similar functional deep learning systems for cross-
referencing check like DeepXplore and TensorFuzz, but only
need to try minimum changes over the original inputs to
find those new inputs that improve neural coverage but
have different predictive results with the original inputs.
The preliminary evaluation on MNIST and ImageNet shows
that compared with DeepXplore, DLFuzz is able to generate
135% to 584.62% more inputs with 20.11% less time con-
sumption.
Xie et al. [84] presented a metamorphic transformation
based coverage guided fuzzing technique, DeepHunter,
which leverages both neuron coverage and coverage criteria
presented by DeepGauge [85]. DeepHunter uses a more
6 A recent DNN-based method to perform image-to-image transforma-
tion [76]
fine-grained metamorphic mutation strategy to generate
tests, which demonstrates the advantage in reducing the
false positive rate. It also demonstrates its advantage in
achieve high coverage and bug detection capability.
Wicker et al. [86] proposed feature-guided test gen-
eration. They adopted Scale-Invariant Feature Transform
(SIFT) to identify features that represent an image with a
Gaussian mixture model, then transformed the problem of
finding adversarial examples into a two-player turn-based
stochastic game. They used Monte Carlo Tree Search to
identify those elements of an image most vulnerable as the
means of generating adversarial examples. The experiments
show that their black-box approach is competitive with
some state-of-the-art white-box methods.
Instead of targeting supervised learning, Uesato et
al. [87] proposed to evaluate reinforcement learning with ad-
versarial example generation. The detection of catastrophic
failures is expensive because failures are rare. To alleviate
the cost problem, the authors proposed to use a failure
probability predictor to estimate the probability that the
agent fails, which was demonstrated to be both effective
and efficient.
There are also fuzzers for specific application scenarios
other than image classifications. Zhou et al. [88] combined
fuzzing and metamorphic testing to test the LiDAR obstacle-
perception module of real-life self-driving cars, and repor-
ted previously unknown fatal software faults eight days
before Uber’s deadly crash in Tempe, AZ, in March 2018.
Jha et al. [89] investigated how to generate the most effective
test cases (the faults that are most likely to lead to violations
of safety conditions) via modelling the fault injection as a
Bayesian network. The evaluation based on two production-
grade AV systems from NVIDIA and Baidu revealed many
situations where faults lead to safety violations.
Udeshi and Chattopadhyay [90] generates inputs for
text classification tasks and make fuzzing considering the
grammar under test as well as the distance between inputs.
Nie et al. [91] and Wang et al. [92] mutated the sentences
in NLI (Natural Language Inference) tasks to generate test
inputs for robustness testing. Chan et al. [93] generated
adversarial examples for DNC to expose its robustness prob-
lems. Udeshi et al. [94] focused much on individual fairness
and generated test inputs that highlight the discriminatory
nature of the model under test. We give details about these
domain-specific fuzz testing techniques in Section 8.
Tuncali et al. [95] proposed a framework for testing
autonomous driving systems. In their work they compared
three test generation strategies: random fuzz test generation,
covering array [96] + fuzz test generation, and covering
array + search-based test generation (using Simulated An-
nealing algorithm [97]). The results indicated that the test
generation strategy with search-based technique involved
has the best performance in detecting glancing behaviours.
5.1.3 Symbolic Execution Based Test Input Generation
Symbolic execution is a program analysis technique to test
whether certain properties can be violated by the software
under test [98]. Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE, also
called concolic testing) is a technique used to automatic-
ally generate test inputs that achieve high code coverage.
DSE executes the program under test with random test
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inputs and performs symbolic execution in parallel to collect
symbolic constraints obtained from predicates in branch
statements along the execution traces. The conjunction of all
symbolic constraints along a path is called a path condition.
When generating tests, DSE randomly chooses one test
input from the input domain, then uses constraint solving
to reach a target branch condition in the path [99]. DSE
has been found to be accurate and effective, and has been
the fundamental technique of some vulnerability discovery
tools [100].
In ML testing, the model’s performance is decided, not
only by the code, but also by the data, and thus symbolic
execution has two application scenarios: either on the data
or on the code.
Symbolic analysis was applied to abstract the data to
generate more effective tests to expose bugs by Ramanathan
and Pullum [7]. They proposed a combination of symbolic
and statistical approaches to efficiently find test cases to find
errors in ML systems. The idea is to distance-theoretically
abstract the data using symbols to help search for those
test inputs where minor changes in the input will cause
the algorithm to fail. The evaluation of the implementation
of a k-means algorithm indicates that the approach is able
to detect subtle errors such as bit-flips. The examination of
false positives may also be a future research interest.
When applying symbolic execution on the machine
learning code, there comes many challenges. Gopinath [101]
listed three such challenges for neural networks in their
paper, which work for other ML modes as well: (1) the
networks have no explicit branching; (2) the networks may
be highly non-linear, with no well-developed solvers for
constraints; and (3) there are scalability issues because the
structure of the ML models are usually very complex and
are beyond the capabilities of current symbolic reasoning
tools.
Considering these challenges, Gopinath [101] introduced
DeepCheck. It transforms a Deep Neural Network (DNN)
into a program to enable symbolic execution to find pixel
attacks that have the same activation pattern as the original
image. In particular, the activation functions in DNN follow
an IF-Else branch structure, which can be viewed as a path
through the translated program. DeepCheck is able to create
1-pixel and 2-pixel attacks by identifying most of the pixels
or pixel-pairs that the neural network fails to classify the
corresponding modified images.
Similarly, Agarwal et al. [102] apply LIME [103], a local
explanation tool that approximates a model with linear
models, decision trees, or falling rule lists, to help get the
path used in symbolic execution. Their evaluation based on
8 open source fairness benchmarks shows that the algorithm
generates 3.72 times more successful test cases than random
test generation approach THEMIS [5].
Sun et al. [104] presented DeepConcolic, a dynamic
symbolic execution testing method for DNNs. Concrete ex-
ecution is used to direct the symbolic analysis to particular
MC/DC criteria’ condition, through concretely evaluating
given properties of the ML models. DeepConcolic explicitly
takes coverage requirements as input, and demonstrates
yields over 10% higher neuron coverage than DeepXplore
for the evaluated models.
5.1.4 Synthetic Data to Test Learning Program
Murphy et al. [105] generated data with repeating values,
missing values, or categorical data for testing two ML
ranking applications. Breck et al. [45] used synthetic training
data that adhere to schema constraints to trigger the hidden
assumptions in the code that do not agree with the con-
straints. Zhang et al. [106] used synthetic data with known
distributions to test overfitting. Nakajima and Bui [107]
also mentioned the possibility of generating simple datasets
with some predictable characteristics that can be adopted as
pseudo oracles.
5.2 Test Oracle
Test oracle identification is one of the key problems in ML
testing, to enable the judgement of bug existence. This is the
so-called ‘Oracle Problem’ [9].
In ML testing, the oracle problem is challenging, be-
cause many machine learning algorithms are probabilistic
programs. In this section, we list several popular types of
test oracle that have been studied for ML testing, i.e., meta-
morphic relations, cross-referencing, and model evaluation
metrics.
5.2.1 Metamorphic Relations as Test Oracles
Metamorphic relations have been proposed by Chen et
al. [108] to ameliorate the test oracle problem in traditional
software testing. A metamorphic relation refers to the re-
lationship between the software input change and output
change during multiple program executions. For example,
to test the implementation of the function sin(x), one may
check how the function output changes when the input is
changed from x to pi − x. If sin(x) differs from sin(pi − x),
this observation signals an error without needing to exam-
ine the specific values computed by the implementation.
sin(x) = sin(pi − x) is thus a metamorphic relation that
plays the role of test oracle (also named ‘pseudo oracle’) to
help bug detection.
In ML testing, metamorphic relations are widely studied
to tackle the oracle problem. Many metamorphic relations
are based on transformations of training or test data that are
expected to yield unchanged or certain expected changes
in the predictive output. There are different granularity
of data transformations when studying the correspond-
ing metamorphic relations. Some transformations conduct
coarse-grained changes such as enlarging the dataset or
changing the data order, without changing each single data
instance. We call these transformations ‘Coarse-grained data
transformations’. Some transformations conduct data trans-
formations via smaller changes on each data instance, such
as mutating the attributes, labels, or pixels of images against
each piece of instance, and are referred to as ‘fine-grained’
data transformations in this paper. The related works of each
type of transformations are introduced below.
Coarse-grained Data Transformation. As early as in 2008,
Murphy et al. [109] discuss the properties of machine
learning algorithms that may be adopted as metamorphic
relations. Six transformations of input data are introduced:
additive, multiplicative, permutative, invertive, inclusive,
and exclusive. The changes include adding a constant to
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numerical values; multiplying numerical values by a con-
stant; permuting the order of the input data; reversing the
order of the input data; removing a part of the input data;
adding additional data. Their analysis is on MartiRank,
SVM-Light, and PAYL. Although unevaluated in the 2008
introduction, this work provided a foundation for determ-
ining the relationships and transformations that can be used
for conducting metamorphic testing for machine learning.
Ding et al. [110] proposed 11 metamorphic relations to
test deep learning systems. At the dataset level, the meta-
morphic relations were also based on training data or test
data transformations that were not supposed to affect the
classification accuracy, such as adding 10% training images
into each category of the training data set or removing one
category of the data from the dataset. The evaluation is
based on a classification of biology cell images.
Murphy et al. [111] presented function-level meta-
morphic relations. The evaluation on 9 machine learning
applications indicated that functional-level properties were
170% more effective than application-level properties.
Fine-grained Data Transformation. The metamorphic rela-
tions of Murphy et al. [109] introduced above are general
relations suitable for both supervised and unsupervised
learning algorithms. In 2009, Xie et al. [112] proposed to use
metamorphic relations that were specific to a certain model
to test the implementations of supervised classifiers. The
paper presents five types of metamorphic relations that en-
able the prediction of expected changes to the output (such
as changes in classes, labels, attributes) based on particular
changes to the input. Manual analysis of the implementation
of KNN and Naive Bayes from Weka [113] indicates that
not all metamorphic relations are proper or necessary. The
differences in the metamorphic relations between SVM and
neural networks are also discussed in [114]. Dwarakanath
et al. [115] applied metamorphic relations to image classific-
ations with SVM and deep learning systems. The changes
on the data include changing the feature or instance orders,
linear scaling of the test features, normalisation or scaling up
the test data, or changing the convolution operation order
of the data. The proposed MRs are able to find 71% of
the injected bugs. Sharma and Wehrheim [116] considered
fine-grained data transformations such as changing feature
names, renaming feature values to test fairness. They stud-
ied 14 classifiers, none of them were found to be sensitive to
feature name shuffling.
Zhang et al. [106] proposed Perturbed Model Valida-
tion (PMV) which combines metamorphic relation and data
mutation to detect overfitting. PMV mutates the training
data via injecting noise in the training data to create per-
turbed training datasets, then checks the training accuracy
decrease rate when the noise degree increases. The faster the
training accuracy decreases, the less the overfitting degree
is.
Al-Azani and Hassine [117] studied the metamorphic
relations of Naive Bayes, k-Nearest Neighbour, as well as
their ensemble classifier. It turns out that the metamorphic
relations necessary for Naive Bayes and k-Nearest Neigh-
bour may be not necessary for their ensemble classifier.
Tian et al. [72] and Zhang et al. [75] stated that the
autonomous vehicle steering angle should not change signi-
ficantly or stay the same for the transformed images under
different weather conditions. Ramanagopal et al. [118] used
the classification consistency of similar images to serve
as test oracles for testing self-driving cars. The evaluation
indicates a precision of 0.94 when detecting errors in unla-
belled data.
Additionally, Xie et al. [119] proposed METTLE, a meta-
morphic testing approach for unsupervised learning val-
idation. METTLE has six types of different-grained meta-
morphic relations that are specially designed for unsu-
pervised learners. These metamorphic relations manipulate
instance order, distinctness, density, attributes, or inject out-
liers of the data. The evaluation was based on synthetic data
generated by Scikit-learn, showing that METTLE is prac-
tical and effective in validating unsupervised learners. Na-
kajima et al. [107], [120] discussed the possibilities of using
different-grained metamorphic relations to find problems in
SVM and neural networks, such as to manipulate instance
order or attribute order and to reverse labels and change
attribute values, or to manipulate the pixels in images.
Metamorphic Relations between Different Datasets. The
consistency relations between/among different datasets can
also be regarded as metamorphic relations that could be
applied to detect data bugs. Kim et al. [121] and Breck et
al. [45] studied the metamorphic relation between training
data and new data. If the training data and new data have
different distributions, the training data have problems.
Breck et al. [45] also studied the metamorphic relations
among different datasets that are close in time: these data-
sets are expected to share some characteristics because it is
uncommon to have frequent drastic changes to the data-
generation code.
Frameworks to Apply Metamorphic Relations. Murphy
et al. [122] implemented a framework called Amsterdam
to automates the process of using metamorphic relation to
detect ML bugs. The framework reduces false positives via
setting thresholds when doing result comparison. They also
developed Corduroy [111], which extended Java Modelling
Language to let developers specify metamorphic properties
and generate test cases for ML testing.
We will introduce more related work about using
domain-specific metamorphic relations of testing autonom-
ous driving, Differentiable Neural Computer (DNC) [93],
machine translation systems [123], [124], biological cell clas-
sification [79], and audio-based deep learning systems [78]
in Section 8.
5.2.2 Cross-Referencing as Test Oracles
Cross-Referencing is another type of test oracles in ML test-
ing, including differential Testing and N-version Program-
ming. Differential testing is a traditional software testing
technique that detects bugs by observing whether similar
applications yield different outputs regarding identical in-
puts [11], [125]. Differential testing is one of the major
testing oracles for detecting compiler bugs [126]. It is closely
related with N-version programming [127]: N-version pro-
gramming aims to generate multiple functionally equivalent
programs based on one specification, so that the combina-
tion of different versions are more fault-tolerant and robust.
Davis and Weyuker [11] discussed the possibilities of
differential testing for ‘non-testable’ programs. The idea
is that if multiple implementation of an algorithm yields
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different outputs on one identical input, then one or both of
the implementation contains a defect. Alebiosu et al. [128]
evaluated this idea on machine learning, and successfully
found 5 faults from 10 Naive Bayes implementations and 4
faults from 20 k-nearest neighbour implementation.
Pham et al. [48] also adopted multiple implementation
to test ML implementations, but focused on the implement-
ation of deep learning libraries. They proposed CRADLE,
the first approach that focuses on finding and localising
bugs in deep learning software libraries. The evaluation
was conducted on three libraries (TensorFlow, CNTK, and
Theano), 11 datasets (including ImageNet, MNIST, and KGS
Go game), and 30 pre-trained models. It turned out that
CRADLE detects 104 unique inconsistencies and 12 bugs.
DeepXplore [1] and DLFuzz [83] used differential testing
as test oracles to find effective test inputs. Those test inputs
causing different behaviours among different algorithms or
models are preferred during test generation.
Most differential testing relies on multiple implementa-
tions or versions, while Qin et al. [129] used the behaviours
of ‘mirror’ programs, generated from the training data as
pseudo oracles. A mirror program is a program generated
based on training data, so that the behaviours of the pro-
gram represent the training data. If the mirror program has
similar behaviours on test data, it is an indication that the
behaviour extracted from the training data suit test data as
well.
5.2.3 Measurement Metrics for Designing Test Oracles
Some work has presented definitions or statistical measure-
ments of non-functional features of ML systems including
robustness [130], fairness [131], [132], [133], and interpretab-
ility [64], [134]. These measurements are not direct oracles
for testing, but are essential for testers to understand and
evaluate the property under test, and provide some actual
statistics that can be compared with the expected ones. For
example, the definitions of different types of fairness [131],
[132], [133] (more details are in Section 6.5.1) define the
conditions an ML system has to satisfy without which the
system is not fair. These definitions can be adopted directly
to detect fairness violations.
Except for these popular test oracles in ML testing, there
are also some domain-specific rules that could be applied
to design test oracles. We discussed several domain-specific
rules that could be adopted as oracles to detect data bugs
in Section 7.1.1. Kang et al. [135] discussed two types of
model assertions under the task of car detection in videos:
flickering assertion to detect the flickering in car bounding
box, and multi-box assertion to detect nested-car bounding.
For example, if a car bounding box contains other boxes,
the multi-box assertion fails. They also proposed some
automatic fix rules to set a new predictive result when a
test assertion fails.
There has also been a discussion about the possibility of
evaluating ML learning curve in lifelong machine learning
as the oracle [136]. An ML system can pass the test oracle if
it can grow and increase its knowledge level over time.
5.3 Test Adequacy
Test adequacy evaluation is to find out whether the existing
tests have a good fault-revealing ability, and provides an
objective confidence measurement on the testing activities.
The adequacy criteria can also be adopted to guide test
generation. Popular test adequacy evaluation techniques
in traditional software testing include code coverage and
mutation testing, which are also adopted in ML testing.
5.3.1 Test Coverage
In traditional software testing, code coverage measures the
degree to which the source code of a program is executed by
a test suite [137]. The higher coverage a test suite achieves, it
is more probable that the hidden bugs could be uncovered.
In other words, covering the code fragment is a necessary
condition to detect the defects hidden in the code. It is often
desirable to create test suites to achieve higher coverage.
Unlike traditional software, code coverage is seldom a
demanding criterion for ML testing, since the decision logic
of an ML model is not written manually but rather are
learned from training data. For example, in the study of
Pei et al. [1], 100 % traditional code coverage is easy to
achieve with a single randomly chosen test input. Instead,
researchers propose various types of coverage for ML mod-
els beyond code coverage.
Neuron coverage. Pei et al. [1] pioneered to propose the
very first coverage criterion, neuron coverage, particularly
designed for deep learning testing. Neuron coverage is
calculated as the ratio of the number of unique neurons
activated by all test inputs and the total number of neurons
in a DNN. In particular, a neuron is activated if its output
value is larger than a user-specified threshold.
Ma et al. [85] extended the concept of neuron coverage.
They first profile a DNN based on the training data, so
that obtain the activation behaviour of each neuron against
the training data. Based on this they propose more fined-
grained criteria, k-multisection neuron coverage, neuron
boundary coverage, and strong neuron activation coverage,
to represent the major functional behaviour and corner
behaviour of a DNN.
MC/DC coverage variants. Sun et al. [138] proposed four
test coverage criteria that are tailored to the distinct features
of DNN inspired by the MC/DC coverage criteria [139].
MC/DC observes the change of a Boolean variable, while
their proposed criteria observe a sign, value, or distance
change of a neuron, in order to capture the causal changes
in the test inputs. The approach assumes the DNN to be a
fully-connected network, and does not consider the context
of a neuron in its own layer as well as different neuron
combinations within the same layer [140].
Layer-level coverage. Ma et al. [85] also presented layer-
level coverage criteria, which considers the top hyperactive
neurons and their combinations (or the sequences) to char-
acterise the behaviours of a DNN. The coverage is evaluated
to have better performance together with neuron coverage
based on dataset MNIST and ImageNet. In their following-
up work [141], [142] , they further proposed combinatorial
testing coverage, which checks the combinatorial activation
status of the neurons in each layer via checking the fraction
of neurons activation interaction in a layer. Sekhon and
Fleming [140] defined a coverage criteria that looks for 1) all
pairs of neurons in the same layer having all possible value
combinations, and 2) all pairs of neurons in consecutive
layers having all possible value combinations.
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State-level coverage. While aftermentioned criteria to some
extent capture the behaviours of feed-forward neural net-
works, they do not explicitly characterise the stateful ma-
chine learning system like recurrent neural network (RNN).
The RNN-based ML system achieves great success in applic-
ation to handle sequential inputs, e.g., speech audio, natural
language, cyber physical control signals. Towards analyzing
such stateful ML systems, Du et al. [78] proposed the first
set of testing criteria specialised for RNN-based stateful
deep learning systems. They first abstracted a stateful deep
learning system as a probabilistic transition system. Based
on the modelling, they proposed criteria based on the state
and traces of the transition system, to capture the dynamic
state transition behaviours.
Limitations of Coverage Criteria. Although there are differ-
ent types of coverage criteria, most of them focus on DNNs.
Sekhon and Fleming [140] examined the existing testing
methods for DNNs and discussed the limitations of these
criteria.
Up to present, most proposed coverage criteria are
based on the structure of a DNN. Li et al. [143] pointed
out the limitations of structural coverage criteria for deep
networks caused by the fundamental differences between
neural networks and human-written programs. Their initial
experiments with natural inputs found no strong correlation
between the number of misclassified inputs in a test set and
its structural coverage. Due to the black-box nature of a
machine learning system, it is not clear how such criteria
directly relate to the system decision logic.
5.3.2 Mutation Testing
In traditional software testing, mutation testing evalu-
ates the fault-revealing ability of a test suite via injecting
faults [137], [144]. The ratio of detected faults against all
injected faults is called the Mutation Score.
In ML testing, the behaviour of an ML system depends
on, not only the learning code, but also data and model
structure. Ma et al. [145] proposed DeepMutation, which
mutates DNNs at the source level or model level, to make
minor perturbation on the decision boundary of a DNN.
Based on this, a mutation score is defined as the ratio of
test instances of which results are changed against the total
number of instances.
Shen et al. [146] proposed five mutation operators for
DNNs and evaluated properties of mutation on the MINST
dataset. They pointed out that domain-specific mutation
operators are needed to enhance mutation analysis.
Compared with structural coverage criteria, mutation
testing based criteria is more directly relevant to the decision
boundary of a DNN. For example, an input data that is near
the decision boundary of a DNN, could more easily detect
the inconsistency between a DNN and its mutants.
5.3.3 Surprise Adequacy
Kim et al. [121] introduced surprise adequacy to measure
the coverage of discretised input surprise range for deep
learning systems. They argued that a ‘good’ test input
should be ‘sufficiently but not overly surprising’ compar-
ing with the training data. Two measurements of surprise
were introduced: one is based on Keneral Density Estim-
ation (KDE) to approximate the likelihood of the system
having seen a similar input during training, the other is
based on the distance between vectors representing the
neuron activation traces of the given input and the training
data(e.g., Euclidean distance).
5.3.4 Rule-based Checking of Test Adequacy
To ensure the functionality of an ML system, there may be
some typical rules that are necessary to examine. Breck et
al. [147] offered 28 test aspects to consider and a scoring
system used by Google. Their focus is to measure how well a
given machine learning system is tested. The 28 test aspects
are classified into four types: 1) the tests for the ML model
itself, 2) the tests for ML infrastructure used to build the
model, 3) the tests for ML data used to build the model, and
4) the tests that check whether the ML system work correctly
over time. Most of them are some must-to-check rules that
could be applied to guide test generation. For example,
the training process should be reproducible; all features
should be beneficial; there should be no other model that
is simpler but better in performance than the current one.
They also mentioned that to randomly generate input data
and train the model for a single step of gradient descent is
quite powerful for detecting library mistakes. Their research
indicates that although ML testing is complex, there are
shared properties to design some basic test cases to test the
fundamental functionality of the ML system.
5.4 Test Prioritisation and Reduction
Test input generation in ML has a very large input space
to cover. On the other hand, we need to label every test in-
stance so as to judge predictive accuracy. These two aspects
lead to high test generation costs. Byun et al. [148] used
DNN metrics like cross entropy, surprisal, and Bayesian un-
certainty to prioritise test inputs and experimentally showed
that these are good indicators of inputs that expose unac-
ceptable behaviours, which are also useful for retraining.
Generating test inputs is also computationally expensive.
Zhang et al. [149] proposed to reduce costs by identi-
fying those test instances that denote the more effective
adversarial examples. The approach is a test prioritisation
technique that ranks the test instances based on their sensit-
ivity to noises, because the instance that is more sensitive to
noise is more likely to yield adversarial examples.
Li et. al [150] focused on test data reduction in oper-
ational DNN testing. They proposed a sampling technique
guided by the neurons in the last hidden layer of a DNN, us-
ing a cross-entropy minimisation based distribution approx-
imation technique. The evaluation was conducted on pre-
trained models with three image datasets: MNIST, Udacity
challenge, and ImageNet. The results show that compared
with random sampling, their approach samples only half
the test inputs to achieve a similar level of precision.
5.5 Bug Report Analysis
Thung et al. [151] were the first to study machine learning
bugs via analysing the bug reports of machine learning sys-
tems. 500 bug reports from Apache Mahout, Apache Lucene,
and Apache OpenNLP were studied. The explored prob-
lems included bug frequency, bug categories, bug severity,
and bug resolution characteristics such as bug-fix time,
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effort, and file number. The results indicated that incorrect
implementation counts for the most ML bugs, i.e., 22.6%
of bugs are due to incorrect implementation of defined
algorithms. Implementation bugs are also the most severe
bugs, and take longer to fix. In addition, 15.6% of bugs are
non-functional bugs. 5.6% of bugs are data bugs.
Zhang et al. [152] studied 175 TensorFlow bugs, based
on the bug reports from Github or StackOverflow. They
studied the symptoms and root causes of the bugs, the ex-
isting challenges to detect the bugs and how these bugs are
handled. They classified TensorFlow bugs into exceptions
or crashes, low correctness, low efficiency, and unknown.
The major causes were found to be in algorithm design and
implementations such as TensorFlow API misuse (18.9%),
unaligned tensor (13.7%), and incorrect model parameter or
structure (21.7%)
Banerjee et al. [153] analysed the bug reports of
autonomous driving systems from 12 autonomous vehicle
manufacturers that drove a cumulative total of 1,116,605 VC
miles in California. They used NLP technologies to classify
the causes of disengagements (i.e., failures that cause the
control of the vehicle to switch from the software to the
human driver) into 10 types. The issues in machine learning
systems and decision control account for the primary cause
of 64 % of all disengagements based on their report analysis.
5.6 Debug and Repair
Data Resampling. The generated test inputs introduced
in Section 5.1 can not only expose ML bugs, but are also
studied to serve as a part of the training data and improve
the model’s correctness through retraining. For example,
DeepXplore achieves up to 3% improvement in classification
accuracy by retraining a deep learning model on generated
inputs. DeepTest [72] improves the model’s accuracy by
46%.
Ma et al. [154] identified the neurons responsible for
the misclassification and call them ‘faulty neurons’. They
resampled training data that influence such faulty neurons
to help improve model performance.
Debugging Framework Development. Cai et al. [155]
presented tfdbg, a debugger for ML models built on Tensor-
Flow, containing three key components: 1) the Analyzer,
which makes the structure and intermediate state of the
runtime graph visible; 2) the NodeStepper, which enables
clients to pause, inspect, or modify at a given node of the
graph; 3) the RunStepper, which enables clients to take
higher level actions between iterations of model training.
Vartak et al. [156] proposed the MISTIQUE system to cap-
ture, store, and query model intermediates to help the
debug. Krishnan and Wu [157] presented PALM, a tool that
explains a complex model with a two-part surrogate model:
a meta-model that partitions the training data and a set
of sub-models that approximate the patterns within each
partition. PALM helps developers find out what training
data impact the prediction the most, and target the subset
of training data that account for the incorrect predictions to
assist debugging.
Fix Understanding. Fixing bugs in many machine learning
systems is difficult because bugs can occur at multiple
points in different components. Nushi et al. [158] proposed
a human-in-the-loop approach that simulates potential fixes
in different components through human computation tasks:
humans were asked to simulate improved component states.
The improvements of the system are recorded and com-
pared, to provide guidance to designers about how they can
best improve the system.
5.7 General Testing Framework and Tools
There has also been some work focusing on providing a
testing tool or framework that helps developers to imple-
ment testing activities in a testing workflow. There is a
test framework to generate and validate test inputs for
security testing [159]. Dreossi et al. [160] presented a CNN
testing framework that consists of three main modules: an
image generator, a collection of sampling methods, and a
suite of visualisation tools. Tramer et al. [161] proposed a
comprehensive testing tool to help developers to test and
debug fairness bugs with an easily interpretable bug report.
Nishi et al. [162] proposed a testing framework including
different evaluation aspects such as allowability, achievab-
ility, robustness, avoidability and improvability. They also
discussed different levels of ML testing, such as system,
software, component, and data testing.
6 ML PROPERTIES TO BE TESTED
ML properties concern what required conditions we should
care about in ML testing, and are usually connected with
the behaviour of an ML model after training. The poor
performance in a property, however, may be due to bugs
in any of the ML components (see more in Introduction 7).
This section presents the related work of testing both
functional ML properties and non-functional ML properties.
Functional properties include correctness (Section 6.1) and
overfitting (Section 6.2). Non-functional properties include
robustness and security (Section 6.3), efficiency (Section 6.4),
fairness (Section 6.5).
6.1 Correctness
Correctness concerns the fundamental function accuracy
of an ML system. Classic machine learning validation is
the most well-established and widely-used technology for
correctness testing. Typical machine learning validation ap-
proaches are cross-validation and bootstrap. The principle
is to isolate test data via data sampling to check whether the
trained model fits new cases. There are several approaches
to do cross-validation. In hold out cross-validation [163], the
data are split into two parts: one part as the training data
and the other part as test data7. In k-fold cross-validation,
the data are split into k equal-sized subsets: one subset used
as the test data and the remaining k − 1 as the training
data. The process is then repeated k times, with each of
the subsets serving as the test data. In leave-one-out cross-
validation, k-fold cross-validation is applied, where k is the
total number of data instances. In Bootstrapping, the data
are sampled with replacement [164], and thus the test data
may contain repeated instances.
7 Sometimes validation set is also needed to help train the model, which
circumstance the validation set will be isolated from the training set.
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There are several widely-adopted correctness measure-
ments such as accuracy, precision, recall, and AUC. There
has been work [165] analysing the disadvantages of each
measurement criterion. For example, accuracy does not dis-
tinguish between the types of errors it makes (False Positive
versus False Negatives). Precision and Recall may be misled
when data is very unbalanced. An indication of these work
is that we should carefully choose the performance metrics
and it is essential to consider their meanings when adopting
them. Chen et al. studied the variability of both training
data and test data when assessing the correctness of an
ML classifier [166]. They derived analytical expressions for
the variance of the estimated performance and provided
an open-source software implemented with an efficient
computation algorithm. They also studied the performance
of different statistical methods when comparing AUC, and
found that F -test has the best performance [167].
To better capture correctness problems, Qin et al. [129]
proposed to generate a mirror program from the training
data, and then use the behaviours this mirror program
to serve as a correctness oracle. The mirror program is
expected to have similar behaviours as the test data.
There has been a study on the popularity of prevalence
of correctness problems among all the reported ML bugs:
Zhang et al. [152] studied 175 Tensorflow bug reports from
StackOverflow QA (Question and Answer) pages and from
Github projects. Among the 175 bugs, 40 of them concern
poor correctness.
Additionally, there have been many works on detecting
data bug that may lead to low correctness [168], [169],
[170] (see more in Section 7.1), test input or test oracle
design [110], [114], [115], [117], [124], [147], [154], and test
tool design [156], [158], [171] (see more in Section 5).
6.2 Overfitting
When a model is too complex for the data, even the noise of
training data is fitted by the model [172]. The overfitting
easily happens, especially when the training data is not
sufficient, [173], [174], [175]. Overfitting may lead to high
correctness on the existing training data yet low correctness
on the unseen data.
Cross-validation is traditionally considered to be a useful
way to detect overfitting. However, it is not always clear
how much overfitting is acceptable and cross-validation
could be unlikely to detect overfitting if the test data is
unrepresentative of potential unseen data.
Zhang et al. [106] introduced Perturbed Model Valid-
ation (PMV) to detect overfitting (and also underfitting).
PMV injects noise to the training data, re-trains the model
against the perturbed data, then uses the training accuracy
decrease rate to detect overfitting/underfitting. The intu-
ition is that an overfitted learner tends to fit noise in the
training sample, while an underfitted learner will have
low training accuracy regardless the presence of injected
noise. Thus, both overfitting and underfitting tend to be
less insensitive to noise and exhibit a small accuracy de-
crease rate against noise degree on perturbed data. PMV
was evaluated on four real-world datasets (breast cancer,
adult, connect-4, and MNIST) and nine synthetic datasets
in the classification setting. The results reveal that PMV has
much better performance and provides more recognisable
signal in detecting both overfitting/underfitting than cross-
validation.
An ML system usually gathers new data after deploy-
ment, which will be added into the training data to improve
correctness. The test data, however, cannot be guaranteed
to represent the future data. DeepMind presents an overfit-
ting detection approach via generating adversarial examples
from test data [42]. If the reweighted error estimate on
adversarial examples is sufficiently different from that of
the original test set, overfitting is detected. They evaluated
their approach on ImageNet and CIFAR-10.
Gossmann et al. [176] studied the threat of test data
reuse practice in the medical domain with extensive simula-
tion studies, and found that the repeated reuse of the same
test data will inadvertently result in overfitting under all
considered simulation settings.
Kirk [51] mentioned that we could use training time as
a complexity proxy of an ML model; it is better to choose
the algorithm with equal correctness but relatively small
training time.
Ma et al. [154] treated data as one of the important reas-
ons for the low performance of the model and its overfitting.
They tried to relieve the overfitting problem via re-sampling
the training data. The approach is found to improve test
accuracy from 75% to 93% in average based on evaluation
of three image classification datasets.
6.3 Robustness and Security
6.3.1 Robustness Measurement Criteria
Unlike correctness or overfitting, robustness is a non-
functional characteristic of a machine learning system. A
natural way to measure robustness is to check the cor-
rectness of the system with the existence of noise [130]; a
robust system should maintain performance in the presence
of noise.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [177] proposed DeepFool that
computes perturbations (added noise) that ‘fool’ deep net-
works so as to quantify their robustness. Bastani et al. [178]
presented three metrics to measure robustness: 1) pointwise
robustness, indicating the minimum input change a classi-
fier fails to be robust; 2) adversarial frequency, indicating
how often changing an input changes a classifier’s results;
3) adversarial severity, indicating the distance between an
input and its nearest adversarial example.
Carlini and Wagner [179] created a set of attacks that
can be used to construct an upper bound on the robustness
of a neural network. Tjeng et al. [130] proposed to use the
distance between a test input and its closest adversarial ex-
ample to measure the robustness. Ruan et al. [180] provided
global robustness lower and upper bounds based on the
test data to quantify the robustness. Gopinath [181] et al.
proposed DeepSafe, a data-driven approach for assessing
DNN robustness: inputs that are clustered into the same
group should share the same label.
More recently, Mangal et al. [182] proposed the definition
of probabilistic robustness. Their work used abstract inter-
pretation to approximate the behaviour of a neural network
and to compute an over-approximation of the input regions
where the network may exhibit non-robust behaviour.
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Banerjee et al. [183] explored the use of Bayesian Deep
Learning to model the propagation of errors inside deep
neural networks to mathematically model the sensitivity of
neural networks to hardware errors, without performing
extensive fault injection experiments.
6.3.2 Perturbation Targeting Test Data
The existence of adversarial examples allows attacks that
may lead to serious consequences in safety-critical applic-
ations such as self-driving cars. There is a whole separate
literature on adversarial example generation that deserves
a survey of its own, and so this paper does not attempt
to fully cover it, but focus on those promising aspects that
could be fruitful areas for future research at the intersection
of traditional software testing and machine learning.
Carlini and Wagner [179] developed adversarial ex-
ample generation approaches using distance metrics to
quantify similarity. The approach succeeded in generating
adversarial examples for all images on the recently pro-
posed defensively distilled networks [184].
Adversarial input generation has been widely adopted
to test the robustness of autonomous driving system [1],
[72], [75], [85], [86]. There has also been research efforts in
generating adversarial inputs for NLI models [91], [92](Sec-
tion 8.3), malware detection [159], and Differentiable Neural
Computer (DNC) [93].
Papernot et al. [185], [186] designed a library to standard-
ise the implementation of adversarial example construction.
They pointed out that standardising adversarial example
generation is very important because ‘benchmarks construc-
ted without a standardised implementation of adversarial
example construction are not comparable to each other’: it
is not easy to tell whether a good result is caused by a high
level of robustness or by the differences in the adversarial
example construction procedure.
Other techniques to generate test data to check the
robustness of neural networks include symbolic execu-
tion [101], [104], fuzz testing [83], combinatorial Test-
ing [141], and abstract interpretation [182]. In Section 5.1, we
introduce more contents about test generation techniques.
6.3.3 Perturbation Targeting the Whole System
There has been research on generating perturbations in the
system and record the system’s reactions towards them. Jha
et al. [187] presented AVFI, which used application/soft-
ware fault injection to approximate hardware errors in the
sensors, processors, or memory of the autonomous vehicle
(AV) systems to test the robustness. They also presented
Kayotee [188], a fault injection-based tool to systemat-
ically inject faults into software and hardware compon-
ents of the autonomous driving systems. Compared with
AVFI,Kayotee is capable of characterising error propagation
and masking using a closed-loop simulation environment,
which is also capable of injecting bit flips directly into GPU
and CPU architectural state. DriveFI [89], further presented
by Jha et al., is a fault-injection engine that mines situations
and faults that maximally impact AV safety.
Tuncali et al. [95] considered the closed-loop behaviour
of the whole system to support adversarial example gener-
ation for autonomous driving systems, not only in image
space, but also in configuration space.
6.4 Efficiency
The empirical study of Zhang et al. [152] on Tensorflow
bug-related artefacts (from StackOverflow QA page and
Github) found that nine out of 175 ML bugs (5.1%) belong to
efficiency problems. This proportion is not high. The reasons
may either be that efficiency problems rarely occur or these
issues are difficult to detect.
Kirk [51] pointed out that it is possible to use the
efficiency of different machine learning algorithms when
training the model to compare their complexity.
Spieker and Gotlieb [189] studied three training data
reduction approaches, the goal of which was to find a
smaller subset of the original training data set with similar
characteristics during model training, so that the model
building speed could be improved for faster machine learn-
ing testing.
6.5 Fairness
Fairness is a relatively recently emerging non-functional
characteristic. According to the work of Barocas and
Selbst [190], there are the following five major causes of
unfairness.
1) Skewed sample: once some initial bias happens, such bias
may compound over time.
2) Tainted examples: the data labels are biased because of
biased labelling activities of human beings.
3) Limited features: features may be less informative or
reliably collected, misleading the model in building the
connection between the features and the labels.
4) Sample size disparity: if the data from the minority group
and the majority group are highly imbalanced, it is less
likely to model the minority group well.
5)Proxies: some features are proxies of sensitive attrib-
utes(e.g., neighbourhood), and may cause bias to the ML
model even if sensitive attributes are excluded.
Research on fairness focuses on measuring, discovering,
understanding, and coping with the observed differences
regarding different groups or individuals in performance.
Measuring and discovering the differences are actually de-
fining and discovering fairness bugs. Such bugs can offend
and even harm users, and cause programmers and busi-
nesses embarrassment, mistrust, loss of revenue, and even
legal violations [161].
6.5.1 Fairness Definitions and Measurement Metrics
There are several definitions of fairness that proposed
in the literature but with no firm consensus being yet
reached [191], [192], [193], [194]. Even though, these defini-
tions can be used as oracles to detect fairness violations in
ML testing.
To help illustrate the formalisation of ML fairness, we
use X to denote a set of individuals, Y to denote the true
label set when making decisions regarding each individual
inX . Let h be the trained machine learning predictive model
that we are testing. Let A be the set of sensitive attributes,
and Z be the remaining attributes.
1) Fairness Through Unawareness. Fairness Through Un-
awareness (FTU) means that an algorithm is fair so long
as the protected attributes are not explicitly used in the
decision-making process [195]. It is a relatively low-cost
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way to define and ensure fairness. Nevertheless, sometimes
the non-sensitive attributes in X may contain sensitive
information correlated to those sensitive attributes that may
still lead to discrimination [191], [195]. Excluding sensitive
attributes may also impact model accuracy and yield less
effective predictive results [196].
2) Group Fairness. A model under test has group fairness if
groups selected based on sensitive attributes have an equal
probability of decision outcomes. There are several types of
group fairness.
Demographic Parity is a popular group fairness meas-
urement [197]. It is also named Statistical Parity or Inde-
pendence Parity. It requires that a decision should be in-
dependent of the protected attributes. Let G1 and G2 be
the two groups belonging to X divided by a sensitive
attribute a ∈ A. A model h under test has group fairness
if P{h(xi) = 1|xi ∈ G1} − P{h(xj) = 1|xj ∈ G2} < .
Equalised Odds is another group fairness approach pro-
posed by Hardt et al. [132]. A model under test h satisfies
Equalised Odds if h is independent of the protected attributes
when a target label Y is fixed as yi: P{h(xi) = 1|xi ∈
G1, Y = yi} = P{h(xj) = 1|xj ∈ G2, Y = yi}.
When the target label is set to be positive, Equalised
Odds becomes Equal Opportunity [132]. It requires that the
true positive rate should be the same for all the groups. A
model h satisfies Equal Opportunity if h is independent of
the protected attributes when a target class Y is fixed as
being positive: P{h(xi) = 1|xi ∈ G1, Y = 1} = P{h(xj) =
1|xj ∈ G2, Y = 1}.
3) Counter-factual Fairness. Kusner et al. [195] introduced
Counter-factual Fairness. A model h satisfies Counter-
factual Fairness if its output remains the same when the
protected attribute is flipped to a counter-factual value, and
other variables modified as determined by the assumed
causal model: P{h(xi)a|a ∈ Axi ∈ X} = P{h(xi)a′ =
yi|a ∈ A, xi ∈ X}. This measurement of fairness addition-
ally provides a mechanism to interpret the causes of bias.
4) Individual Fairness. Dwork et al. [131] proposed a use
task-specific similarity metric to describe the pairs of indi-
viduals that should be regarded as similar. According to
Dwork et al., a model h with individual fairness should
give similar predictive results among similar individuals:
P{h(xi)|xi ∈ X} = P{h(xj) = yi|xj ∈ X} iff d(xi, xj) < ,
where d is a distance metric for individuals that measures
their similarity.
Analysis and Comparison of Fairness Metrics. Although
there are many existing definitions of fairness, each has
its advantages and disadvantages. Which fairness is the
most suitable remains controversial. There is thus some
work surveying and analysing the existing fairness metrics,
or investigate and compare their performance based on
experimental results, as introduced below.
Gajane and Pechenizkiy [191] surveyed how fairness
is defined and formalised in the literature. Corbett-Davies
and Goel [61] studied three types of fairness definitions:
anti-classification, classification parity, and calibration. They
pointed out the deep statistical limitations of each type with
examples. Verma and Rubin [192] explained and illustrated
the existing most prominent fairness definitions based on a
common, unifying dataset.
Saxena et al. [193] investigated people’s perceptions of
three of the fairness definitions. About 200 recruited par-
ticipants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were asked to
choose their preference over three allocation rules on two
individuals having each applied for a loan. The results
demonstrate a clear preference for the way of allocating
resources in proportion to the applicants’ loan repayment
rates.
6.5.2 Test Generation Techniques for Fairness Testing
Galhotra et al. [5], [198] proposed Themis which considers
group fairness using causal analysis [199]. It defines fair-
ness scores as measurement criteria for fairness and uses
random test generation techniques to evaluate the degree of
discrimination (based on fairness scores). Themis was also
reported to be more efficient on systems that exhibit more
discrimination.
Themis generates tests randomly for group fairness,
while Udeshi et al. [94] proposed Aequitas, focusing on
test generation to uncover discriminatory inputs and those
inputs essential to understand individual fairness. The gen-
eration approach first randomly samples the input space
to discover the presence of discriminatory inputs, then
searches the neighbourhood of these inputs to find more in-
puts. Except for detecting fairness bugs, Aeqitas also retrains
the machine-learning models and reduce discrimination in
the decisions made by these models.
Agarwal et al. [102] used symbolic execution together
with local explainability to generate test inputs. The key
idea is to use the local explanation, specifically Local Inter-
pretable Model-agnostic Explanations8 to identify whether
factors that drive decision include protected attributes. The
evaluation indicates that the approach generates 3.72 times
more successful test cases than THEMIS across 12 bench-
marks.
Tramer et al. [161] firstly proposed the concept of ‘fair-
ness bugs’. They consider a statistically significant asso-
ciation between a protected attribute and an algorithmic
output to be a fairness bug, specially named ‘Unwarran-
ted Associations’ in their paper. They proposed the first
comprehensive testing tool, aiming to help developers test
and debug fairness bugs with an ‘easily interpretable’ bug
report. The tool is available for various application areas in-
cluding image classification, income prediction, and health
care prediction.
Sharma and Wehrheim [116] tried to figure out where
the unfairness comes from via checking whether the al-
gorithm under test is sensitive to training data changes.
They mutated the training data in various ways to generate
new datasets, such as changing the order of rows, columns,
and shuffle the feature names and values. 12 out of 14
classifiers were found to be sensitive to these changes.
6.6 Interpretability
Manual Assessment of Interpretability. The existing work
on empirically assessing the interpretability property usu-
ally includes human beings in the loop. That is, manual
8 Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations produces decision
trees corresponding to an input that could provide paths in symbolic
execution [103]
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assessment is currently the major approach to evaluate
interpretability. Doshi-Velez and Kim [64] gave a taxonomy
of evaluation (testing) approaches for interpretability:
application-grounded, human-grounded, and functionally-
grounded. Application-grounded evaluation involves hu-
man beings in the experiments with a real application scen-
ario. Human-grounded evaluation is to do the evaluation
with real humans but with simplified tasks. Functionally-
grounded evaluation requires no human experiments but
uses a quantitative metric as a proxy for explanation quality,
for example, a proxy for the explanation of a decision tree
model may be the depth of the tree.
Friedler et al. [200] introduced two types of interpretabil-
ity: global interpretability means understanding the entirety
of a trained model; local interpretability means understand-
ing the results of a trained model on a specific input and the
corresponding output. They asked 1000 users to produce
the expected output changes of a model given an input
change, and then recorded accuracy and completion time
over varied models. Decision trees and logistic regression
models were found to be more locally interpretable than
neural networks.
Automatic Assessment of Interpretability. Cheng et al. [46]
presented a metric to understand the behaviours of an
ML model. The metric measures whether the learned has
actually learned the object in object identification scenario
via occluding the surroundings of the objects.
Christoph [69] proposed to measure the interpretability
based on the category of ML algorithms. He mentioned that
‘the easiest way to achieve interpretability is to use only
a subset of algorithms that create interpretable models’.
He identified several models with good interpretability,
including linear regression, logistic regression and decision
tree models.
Zhou et al. [201] defined the concepts of metamorphic
relation patterns (MRPs) and metamorphic relation input
patterns (MRIPs) that can be adopted to help end users un-
derstand how an ML system really works. They conducted
case studies of various systems, including large commercial
websites, Google Maps navigation, Google Maps location-
based search, image analysis for face recognition (including
Facebook, MATLAB, and OpenCV), and the Google video
analysis service Cloud Video Intelligence.
Evaluation of Interpretability Improvement Methods. Ma-
chine learning classifiers are widely used in many medical
applications, yet the clinical meaning of the predictive out-
come is often unclear. Chen et al. [202] investigated several
interpretability improving methods which transform classi-
fier scores to the probability of disease scale. They showed
that classifier scores on arbitrary scales can be calibrated to
the probability scale without affecting their discrimination
performance.
7 ML TESTING COMPONENTS
This section organises the related work of ML testing based
on which ML component (data, learning program, or frame-
work) ML testing tests.
7.1 Bug Detection in Data
Data is a ‘component’ to be tested in ML testing, since the
performance of the ML system largely depends on the data.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Breck et al. [45], it is import-
ant to detect data bugs early because predictions from the
trained model are often logged and used to generate more
data, constructing a feedback loop that may amplify even
small data bugs over time.
Nevertheless, data testing is challenging [203]. Accord-
ing to the study of Amershi et al. [8], the management
and evaluation of data is among the most challenging tasks
when developing an AI application in Microsoft. Breck et
al. [45] mentioned that data generation logic often lacks vis-
ibility in the ML pipeline; the data are often stored in a raw-
value format (e.g., CSV) that strips out semantic information
that can help identify bugs; what’s more, the resilience
of some ML algorithms to noisy data and the problems
in correctness metrics add more difficulty to observe the
problems in data.
7.1.1 Bug Detection in Training Data
Rule-based Data Bug Detection. Hynes et al. [168] pro-
posed data linter– a ML tool inspired by code linters to auto-
matically inspect ML datasets. They considered three types
of data problems: 1) miscoding data, such as mistyping a
number or date as a string; 2) outliers and scaling, such
as uncommon list length; 3) packaging errors, such as du-
plicate values, empty examples, and other data organisation
issues.
Cheng et al. [46] presented a series of metrics to eval-
uate whether the training data have covered all important
scenarios.
Performance-based Data Bug Detection. To solve the prob-
lems in training data, Ma et al. [154] proposed MODE.
MODE identifies the ‘faulty neurons’ in neural networks
that are responsible for the classification errors, and tests
the training data via data resampling to analyse whether
the faulty neurons are influenced. MODE allows to improve
test effectiveness from 75 % to 93 % on average based on
evaluation using the MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and CIFAR-
10 datasets.
7.1.2 Bug Detection in Test Data
Metzen et al. [204] proposed to augment DNNs with a small
sub-network specially designed to distinguish genuine data
from data containing adversarial perturbations. Wang et
al. [205] used DNN model mutation to expose adversarial
examples since they found that adversarial samples are
more sensitive to perturbations [206]. The evaluation was
based on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. The approach
detects 96.4 %/90.6 % adversarial samples with 74.1/86.1
mutations for MNIST/CIFAR10.
Adversarial example detection can be regarded as bug
detection in the test data. Carlini and Wagner [207] surveyed
ten proposals that are designed for detecting adversarial
examples and compared their efficacy. They found that
detection approaches rely on the loss functions and can thus
be bypassed when constructing new loss functions. They
concluded that adversarial examples are significantly harder
to detect than previously appreciated.
The insufficiency of the test data may not able to detect
overfitting issues, and could also be regarded as a type of
data bugs. We introduced the approaches in detecting test
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data insufficiency in Section 5.3, such as coverage [1], [72],
[85] and mutation score [145].
7.1.3 Skew Detection in Training and Test Data
The training instances and the instances that the model
predicts should be consistent in aspects such as features and
distributions. Kim et al. [121] proposed two measurements
to evaluate the skew between training and test data: one is
based on Keneral Density Estimation (KDE) to approximate
the likelihood of the system having seen a similar input
during training, the other is based on the distance between
vectors representing the neuron activation traces of the
given input and the training data(e.g., Euclidean distance).
Breck [45] investigated the skew in training data and
serving data (the data that the ML model predicts after de-
ployment). To detect the skew in features, they do key-join
feature comparison. To quantify the skew in distribution,
they argued that general approaches such as KL divergence
or cosine similarity may not work because produce teams
have difficulty in understanding the natural meaning of
these metrics. Instead, they proposed to use the largest
change in probability for a value in the two distributions
as a measurement of their distance.
7.1.4 Frameworks in Detecting Data Bugs
Breck et al. [45] proposed a data validation system for
detecting data bugs. The system applies constraints (e.g.,
type, domain, valency) to find bugs in single-batch (within
the training data or new data), and quantifies the distance
between training data and new data. Their system is de-
ployed as an integral part of TFX (an end-to-end machine
learning platform at Google). The deployment in production
shows that the system helps early detection and debugging
of data bugs. They also summarised the type of data bugs,
in which new feature column, unexpected string values, and
missing feature columns are the three most common.
Krishnan et al. [208], [209] proposed a model train-
ing framework, ActiveClean, that allows for iterative data
cleaning while preserving provable convergence properties.
ActiveClean suggests a sample of data to clean based on the
data’s value to the model and the likelihood that it is ‘dirty’.
The analyst can then apply value transformations and filter-
ing operations to the sample to ‘clean’ the identified dirty
data.
In 2017, Krishnan et al. [169] presented a system named
BoostClean to detect domain value violations (i.e., when an
attribute value is outside of an allowed domain) in training
data. The tool utilises the available cleaning resources such
as Isolation Forest [210] to improve a model’s performance.
After resolving the problems detected, the tool is able to
improve prediction accuracy by up to 9% in comparison to
the best non-ensemble alternative.
ActiveClean and BoostClean may involve human beings
in the loop of testing process. Schelter et al. [170] focus
on the automatic ‘unit’ testing of large-scale datasets. Their
system provides a declarative API that combines common
as well as user-defined quality constraints for data testing.
Krishnan and Wu [211] also targeted automatic data clean-
ing and proposed AlphaClean. They used a greedy tree
search algorithm to automatically tune the parameters for
data cleaning pipelines. With AlphaClean, the user could
focus on defining cleaning requirements and let the system
find the best configuration under the defined requirement.
The evaluation was conducted on three datasets, demon-
strating that AlphaClean finds solutions of up to 9X better
than state-of-the-art parameter tuning methods.
Training data testing is also regarded as a part of a whole
machine learning workflow in the work of Baylor et al. [171].
They developed a machine learning platform that enables
data testing, based on a property description schema that
captures properties such as the features present in the data
and the expected type or valency of each feature.
There are also data cleaning technologies such as statist-
ical or learning approaches from the domain of traditional
database and data warehousing. These approaches are not
specially designed or evaluated for ML, but they can be re-
purposed for ML testing [212].
7.2 Bug Detection in Learning Program
Bug detection in the learning program checks whether the
algorithm is correctly implemented and configured, e.g., the
model architecture is designed well, and whether there exist
coding errors.
Unit Tests for ML Learning Program. McClure [213] in-
troduced ML unit testing with TensorFlow built-in testing
functions to help ensure that ‘code will function as expected’
to help build developers’.
Schaul et al. [214] developed a collection of unit tests
specially designed for stochastic optimisation. The tests are
small-scale, isolated with well-understood difficulty. They
could be adopted in the beginning learning stage to test the
learning algorithms to detect bugs as early as possible.
Algorithm Configuration Examination. Sun et al. [215] and
Guo et al. [216] identified operating systems, language, and
hardware Compatibility issues. Sun et al. [215] studied 329
real bugs from three machine learning frameworks: Scikit-
learn, Paddle, and Caffe. Over 22% bugs are found to
be compatibility problems due to incompatible operating
systems, language versions, or conflicts with hardware. Guo
et al. [216] investigated deep learning frameworks such as
TensorFlow, Theano, and Torch. They compared the learn-
ing accuracy, model size, robustness with different models
classifying dataset MNIST and CIFAR-10.
The study of Zhang et al. [152] indicates that the most
common learning program bug is due to the change of
TensorFlow API when the implementation has not been
updated accordingly. Additionally, 23.9% (38 in 159) of
the bugs from ML projects in their study built based on
TensorFlow arise from problems in the learning program.
Karpov et al. [217] also highlighted testing algorithm
parameters in all neural network testing problems. The
parameters include the number of neurons and their types
based on the neuron layer types, the ways the neurons
interact with each other, the synapse weights, and the activ-
ation functions. However, the work currently still remains
unevaluated.
Algorithm Selection Examination. Developers usually face
more than one learning algorithms to choose from. Fu and
Menzies [218] compared deep learning and classic learning
on the task of linking Stack Overflow questions, and found
that classic learning algorithms (such as refined SVM) could
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achieve similar (and sometimes better) results at a lower
cost. Similarly, the work of Liu et al. [219] found that the
k-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) algorithm achieves similar
results to deep learning for the task of commit message
generation.
Mutant Simulations of Learning Program Faults. Murphy
et al. [111], [122] used mutants to simulate programming
code errors to investigate whether the proposed meta-
morphic relations are effective in detecting errors. They
introduced three types of mutation operators: switching
comparison operators, mathematical operators, and off-by-
one errors for loop variables.
Dolby et al. [220] extended WALA to support static
analysis of the behaviour of tensors in Tensorflow learning
programs written in Python. They defined and tracked
tensor types for machine learning, and changed WALA
to produce a dataflow graph to abstract possible program
behavours.
7.3 Bug Detection in Framework
The current research on framework testing focuses on study-
ing and detecting framework relevant bugs.
7.3.1 Study of Framework Bugs
Xiao et al. [221] focused on the security vulnerabilities of
popular deep learning frameworks including Caffe, Tensor-
Flow, and Torch. They examined the code of popular deep
learning frameworks of these frameworks. The dependency
of these frameworks is found to be very complex. Multiple
vulnerabilities are identified to exist in the implementation
of these frameworks. The most common vulnerabilities are
software bugs that cause programs to crash, or enter an
infinite loop, or exhaust all the memory.
Guo et al. [216] tested deep learning frameworks, in-
cluding TensorFlow, Theano, and Torch, by comparing their
runtime behaviour, training accuracy, and robustness under
identical algorithm design and configuration. The results
indicate that runtime training behaviours are quite different
for each framework, while the prediction accuracies remain
similar.
Low Efficiency is a problem for ML frameworks, which
may directly lead to inefficiency of the models built on them.
Sun et al. [215] found that approximately 10% of the repor-
ted framework bugs concern low efficiency. These bugs are
usually reported by users. Compared with other types of
bugs, they may take longer for developers to resolve.
7.3.2 Framework Implementation Testing
Many learning algorithms are implemented inside ML
frameworks. Implementation bugs in ML frameworks may
cause neither crashes, errors, nor efficiency problems [222],
making their detection challenging.
Challenges in Detecting Implementation Bugs. Thung et
al. [151] studied machine learning bugs as early as in 2012.
The results regarding 500 bug reports from three machine
learning systems indicated that approximately 22.6% bugs
are due to incorrect implementation of defined algorithms.
Cheng et al. [223] injected implementation bugs into classic
machine learning code in Weka and observed the perform-
ance changes that result. They found that 8% to 40% of
the logically non-equivalent executable mutants (injected
implementation bugs) were statistically indistinguishable
from their original versions.
Solutions towards Detecting Implementation Bugs. Some
work has used multiple implementations or differential test-
ing to detect bugs. For example, Alebiosu et al. [128] found
five faults in 10 Naive Bayes implementations and four
faults in 20 k-nearest neighbour implementations. Pham
et al. [48] found 12 bugs in three libraries (i.e., Tensor-
Flow, CNTK, and Theano), 11 datasets (including ImageNet,
MNIST, and KGS Go game), and 30 pre-trained models
(more details could be referred to Section 5.2.2).
However, not every algorithm has multiple implement-
ations, at which case metamorphic testing may be helpful.
Murphy et al. [10], [109] were the first to discuss the possib-
ilities of applying metamorphic relations to machine learn-
ing implementations. They listed several transformations of
the input data that should not affect the outputs, such as
multiplying numerical values by a constant, permuting or
reversing the order of the input data, and adding addi-
tional data. Their case studies, on three machine learning
applications, found metamorphic testing to be an efficient
and effective approach to testing ML applications.
Xie et al. [112] focused on supervised learning. They
proposed to use more specific metamorphic relations to
test the implementations of supervised classifiers. They
discussed five types of potential metamorphic relations on
KNN and Naive Bayes on randomly generated data. In
2011, they further evaluated their approach using mutated
machine learning code [224]. Among the 43 injected faults
in Weka [113] (injected by MuJava [225]), the metamorphic
relations were able to reveal 39, indicating effectiveness. In
their work, the test inputs were randomly generated data.
More evaluation with real-world data is needed.
Dwarakanath et al. [115] applied metamorphic relations
to find implementation bugs in image classification. For
classic machine learning such as SVM, they conducted
mutations such as changing feature or instance orders, lin-
ear scaling of the test features. For deep learning models
such as residual networks, since the data features are not
directly available, they proposed to normalise or scale the
test data, or to change the convolution operation order of
the data. These changes were intended to bring no change
to the model performance when there are no implement-
ation bugs. Otherwise, implementation bugs are exposed.
To evaluate, they used MutPy to inject mutants to simulate
implementation bugs, of which the proposed MRs are able
to find 71%.
8 APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Machine learning has been widely adopted in different areas
such as autonomous driving and machine translation. This
section introduces the domain-specific testing approaches in
three typical application domains.
8.1 Autonomous Driving
Testing autonomous vehicles has a long history. Wegener
and Bühler discussed compared different fitness functions
when evaluating the tests of autonomous car parking sys-
tems [226].
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Most of the current autonomous vehicle systems that
have been put into the market are semi-autonomous
vehicles, which require a human driver to serve as a fall-
back in the case of failure [153], as was the case with the
work of Wegener and Bühler [226]. A failure that causes
the human driver to take control of the vehicle is called a
disengagement.
Banerjee et al. [153] investigated the causes and impacts
of 5,328 disengagements from the data of 12 AV manufac-
turers for 144 vehicles that drove a cumulative 1,116,605
autonomous miles, 42 (0.8%) of which led to accidents. They
classified the causes of disengagements into 10 types. As
high as 64% of the disengagements were found to be caused
by the bugs in the machine learning system, among which
the low performance of image classification (e.g., improper
detection of traffic lights, lane markings, holes, and bumps)
were the dominant causes accounting for 44% of all reported
disengagements. The remaining 20% were due to the bugs
in the control and decision framework such as improper
motion planning.
Pei et al. [1] used gradient-based differential testing to
generate test inputs to detect potential DNN bugs and lever-
aged neuron coverage as a guideline. Tian et al. [72] pro-
posed to use a set of image transformation to generate tests,
which simulate the potential noises that could happen to a
real-world camera. Zhang et al. [75] proposed DeepRoad,
a GAN-based approach to generate test images for real-
world driving scenes. Their approach is able to support two
weather conditions (i.e., snowy and rainy). The images were
generated with the pictures from YouTube videos. Zhou et
al. [77] proposed DeepBillboard, which generates real-world
adversarial billboards that can trigger potential steering
errors of autonomous driving systems. It demonstrates the
possibility of generating continuous and realistic physical-
world tests for practical autonomous-driving systems.
Wicker et al. [86] used feature-guided Monte Carlo Tree
Search to identify elements of an image which are most
vulnerable to a self-driving system to generate adversarial
examples. Jha et al. [89] accelerated the process of finding
‘safety-critical’ via analytically modelling the injection of
faults into an AV system as a Bayesian network. The ap-
proach trains the network to identify safety critical faults
automatically. The evaluation was based on two production-
grade AV systems from NVIDIA and Baidu, indicating that
the approach can find many situations where faults lead to
safety violations.
Uesato et al. [87] aimed to find catastrophic failures
in safety-critical agents like autonomous driving in rein-
forcement learning. They demonstrated the limitations of
traditional random testing, then proposed a predictive ad-
versarial example generation approach to predict failures
and estimate reliable risks. The evaluation on TORCS simu-
lator indicates that the proposed approach is both effective
and efficient with fewer Monte Carlo runs.
To test whether an algorithm can lead to a problematic
model, Dreossi et al. [160] proposed to generate training
data as well as test data. Focusing on Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN), they build a tool to generate natural
images and visualise the gathered information to detect
blind spots or corner cases under the autonomous driving
scenario. Although there is currently no evaluation, the tool
has been made available9.
Tuncali et al. [95] presented a framework that supports
both system-level testing and the testing of those properties
of an ML component. The framework also supports fuzz test
input generation and search-based testing using approaches
such as Simulated Annealing and Cross-Entropy optimisa-
tion.
While many other studies investigated DNN model
testing for research purposes, Zhou et al. [88] combined
fuzzing and metamorphic testing to test LiDAR, which is
an obstacle-perception module of real-life self-driving cars,
and detected real-life fatal bugs.
Jha et al. presented AVFI [187] and Kayotee [188], which
are fault injection-based tools to systematically inject faults
into the autonomous driving systems to assess their safety
and reliability.
8.2 Machine Translation
Machine translation automatically translates text or speech
from one language to another. The BLEU (BiLingual Eval-
uation Understudy) score [227] is a widely-adopted meas-
urement criterion to evaluate machine translation quality.
It assesses the correspondence between a machine’s output
and that of a human.
Zhou et al. [123], [124] used metamorphic relations in
their tool ‘MT4MT’ to evaluate the translation consistency of
machine translation systems. The idea is that some changes
to the input should not affect the overall structure of the
translated output. Their evaluation showed that Google
Translate outperformed Microsoft Translator for long sen-
tences whereas the latter outperformed the former for short
and simple sentences. They hence suggested that the quality
assessment of machine translations should consider mul-
tiple dimensions and multiple types of inputs.
The work of Zheng et al. [228], [229], [230] proposed
two algorithms for detecting two specific types of machine
translation violations: (1) under-translation, where some
words/phrases from the original text are missing in the
translation, and (2) over-translation, where some words/-
phrases from the original text are unnecessarily translated
multiple times. The algorithms are based on a statistical
analysis of both the original texts and the translations, to
check whether there are violations of one-to-one mappings
in words/phrases.
8.3 Natural Language Inference
A Nature Language Inference (NLI) task judges the infer-
ence relationship of a pair of natural language sentences.
For example, the sentence ‘A person is in the room’ could
be inferred from the sentence ‘A girl is in the room’.
Several works have tested the robustness of NLI models.
Nie et al. [91] generated sentence mutants (called ‘rule-based
adversaries’ in the paper) to test whether the existing NLI
models have semantic understanding. Surprisingly, seven
state-of-the-art NLI models (with diverse architectures)
were all unable to recognise simple semantic differences
when the word-level information remains unchanged.
9 https://github.com/shromonag/FalsifyNN
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Similarly, Wang et al. [92] mutated the inference target
pair by simply swapping them. The heuristic is that a good
NLI model should report comparable accuracy between the
original test set and swapped test set for contradiction pairs
and neutral pairs, and lower accuracy in swapped test set
for entailment pairs (the hypothesis may or may not be true
given a premise).
9 ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE REVIEW
This section analyses the research distribution among dif-
ferent testing properties and machine learning categories. It
also summarise the datasets (name, description, size, and
usage scenario of each dataset) that have been used in ML
testing.
9.1 Timeline
Figure 8 shows several big events of ML testing. As early
as in 2007, Murphy et al. [10] mentioned the idea of test-
ing machine learning applications. They classified machine
learning applications as ‘non-testable’ programs considering
the difficulty of getting test oracles. Their testing mainly
refers to the detection of implementation bugs, described
as ‘to ensure that an application using the algorithm cor-
rectly implements the specification and fulfils the users’
expectations. Afterwards, Murphy et al. [109] discussed
the properties of machine learning algorithms that may be
adopted as metamorphic relations to detect implementation
bugs.
In 2009, Xie et al. [112] also applied metamorphic testing
on supervised learning applications.
The testing problem of fairness was proposed in 2012
by Dwork et al. [131]; the problem of interpretability was
proposed in 2016 by Burrell [231].
In 2017, Pei et al. [1] published the first white-box test-
ing paper on deep learning systems. This has become the
milestone of machine learning testing, which pioneered to
propose coverage criteria for DNN. Enlightened by this pa-
per, a number of machine learning testing techniques have
emerged, such as DeepTest [72], DeepGauge [85], Deep-
Concolic [104], and DeepRoad [75]. A number of software
testing techniques has been applied to ML testing, such as
different testing coverage criteria [72], [85], [138], mutation
testing [145], combinatorial testing [142], metamorphic test-
ing [93], and fuzz testing [82].
9.2 Research Distribution among Machine Learning
Categories
This section introduces and compares the research status of
each machine learning category.
9.2.1 Research Distribution between General Machine
Learning and Deep Learning
To explore the research trend of ML testing, we classify
the papers into two categories: those targeting only deep
learning and those designed for general machine learning
(including deep learning).
Among all the 128 papers, 52 papers (40.6 %) present
testing techniques that are specially designed for deep
learning; the remaining 76 papers cater to general machine
learning.
We further investigated the number of papers in each
category for each year, to observe whether there is a trend
of moving from testing general machine learning to deep
learning. Figure 9 shows the results. Before 2017, papers
mostly focus on general machine learning; after 2018, both
general machine learning learning and deep learning testing
notably arise.
9.2.2 Research Distribution among Supervised/Unsuper-
vised/Reinforcement Learning Testing
We further classified the papers based on the three machine
learning categories: 1) supervised learning testing, 2) un-
supervised learning testing, and 3) reinforcement learning
testing. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, almost all the work
we identified in this survey focused on testing supervised
machine learning. Among the 128 related papers, there are
currently only three papers testing unsupervised machine
learning: Murphy et al. [109] introduced metamorphic re-
lations that work for both supervised and unsupervised
learning algorithms. Ramanathan and Pullum [7] proposed
a combination of symbolic and statistical approaches to test
k-means algorithm, which is a clustering algorithm. Xie et
al. [119] designed metamorphic relations for unsupervised
learning. One paper focused on reinforcement learning test-
ing: Uesato et al. [87] proposed a predictive adversarial ex-
ample generation approach to predict failures and estimate
reliable risks in reinforcement learning.
We then tried to understand whether the imbalanced
testing distribution among different categories is due to
the imbalance of their research popularity. To approxim-
ate the research popularity of each category, we searched
terms ‘supervised learning’, ‘unsupervised learning’, and
‘reinforcement learning’ in Google Scholar and Google.
Table 4 shows the results of search hits. The last column
shows the number/ratio of papers that touch each machine
learning category in ML testing. For example, 115 out of
128 papers were observed for supervised learning testing
purpose. The table shows that testing popularity of different
categories is obviously disproportionate to their overall re-
search popularity. In particular, reinforcement learning has
higher search hits than supervised learning, but we did not
observe any related work that conducts direct reinforcement
learning testing.
There may be several reasons for this observation. First,
supervised learning is a widely-known learning scenario
associated with classification, regression, and ranking prob-
lems [28]. It is natural that researchers would emphasise the
testing of widely-applied, known and familiar techniques
at the beginning. Second, supervised learning usually has
labels in the dataset. It is thereby easier to judge and analyse
test effectiveness.
Nevertheless, many opportunities clearly remain for re-
search in the widely studied areas of unsupervised learning
and reinforcement learning (we discuss more in Section 10).
9.2.3 Different Learning Tasks
ML has different tasks such as classification, regression,
clustering, and dimension reduction (see more in Section 2).
The research focus on different tasks also shows to be highly
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Table 4: Search hits and testing distribution of super-
vised/unsupervised/reinforcement Learning
Category Scholar hits Google hits Testing hits
Supervised 1,610k 73,500k 115/128
Unsupervised 619k 17,700k 3/128
Reinforcement 2,560k 74,800k 1/128
imbalanced: among the papers we identified, almost all of
them focus on classification.
9.3 Research Distribution among Different Testing
Properties
We counted the number of papers concerning each ML
testing property. Figure 10 shows the results. The properties
in the legend are ranked based on the number of papers that
are specially focused testing this property (‘general’ refers to
those papers discussing or surveying ML testing generally).
From the figure, around one-third (32.1%) of the papers
test correctness. Another one-third of the papers focus on
robustness and security problems. Fairness testing ranks the
third among all the properties, with 13.8% papers.
Nevertheless, for overfitting detection, interpretability
testing, and efficiency testing, only three papers exist for
each in our paper collection. For privacy, there are some
papers discussing how to ensure privacy [232], but we did
not find papers that systematically ‘test’ privacy or detect
privacy violations.
36.7%
29.7%
12.5%
10.9%
correctness
robustness&security
general
fairness
overfitting
interpretability
efficiency
Figure 10: Research distribution among different testing
properties
9.4 Datasets Used in ML Testing
Tables 5 to 8 show the details for some widely-adopted
datasets used in ML testing research. In each table, the first
column shows the name and link of each dataset. The next
a few columns give a brief description, the size (training set
size + test set size if applicable), the testing problem(s), the
usage application scenario of each dataset10.
Table 5 shows the datasets used for image classification
tasks. Most datasets are often very large (e.g., more than 1.4
million images in ImageNet). The last six rows show the
datasets collected for autonomous driving system testing.
Most image datasets are adopted to test the correctness,
overfitting, and robustness of ML systems.
Table 6 shows the datasets related to natural language
processing. The contents are usually texts, sentences, or files
with texts, with the usage scenarios like robustness and
correctness.
The datasets used to make decisions are introduced in
Table 6. They are usually records with personal information,
and thus are widely adopted to test the fairness of the ML
models.
We also calculate how many datasets an ML testing
paper usually uses in the evaluation (for those papers with
an evaluation). Figure 11 shows the results. Surprisingly,
most papers use only one or two datasets in the evalu-
10 These tables do not list data cleaning datasets because many data can
be dirty and some evaluation may involve hundreds of data sets [169]
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Table 5: Datasets (1/4): Image Classification
Dataset Description Size Usage
MNIST [233] Images of handwritten digits 60,000+10,000 correctness, overfit-
ting, robustness
Fashion MNIST [234] MNIST-like dataset of fashion images 70,000 correctness, overfit-
ting
CIFAR-10 [235] General images with 10 classes 50,000+10,000 correctness, overfit-
ting, robustness
ImageNet [236] Visual recognition challenge dataset 14,197,122 correctness, robust-
ness
IRIS flower [237] The Iris flowers 150 overfitting
SVHN [238] House numbers 73,257+26,032 correctness,robustness
Fruits 360 [239] Dataset with 65,429 images of 95 fruits 65,429 correctness,robustness
Handwritten Letters [240] Colour images of Russian letters 1,650 correctness,robustness
Balance Scale [241] Psychological experimental results 625 overfitting
DSRC [242] Wireless communications between vehicles and road
side units
10,000 overfitting, robust-
ness
Udacity challenge [73] Udacity Self-Driving Car Challenge images 101,396+5,614 robustness
Nexar traffic light chal-
lenge [243]
Dashboard camera 18,659+500,000 robustness
MSCOCO [244] Object recognition 160,000 correctness
Autopilot-TensorFlow [245] Recorded to test the NVIDIA Dave model 45,568 robustness
KITTI [246] Six different scenes captured by a VW Passat station
wagon equipped with four video cameras
14,999 robustness
Table 6: Datasets (2/4): Natural Language Processing
Dataset Description Size Usage
bAbI [247] questions and answers for NLP 1000+1000 robustness
Tiny Shakespeare [248] Samples from actual Shakespeare 100,000 char-
acter
correctness
Stack Exchange Data
Dump [249]
Stack Overflow questions and answers 365 files correctness
SNLI [250] Stanford Natural Language Inference Corpus 570,000 robustness
MultiNLI [251] Crowd-sourced collection of sentence pairs annotated
with textual entailment information
433,000 robustness
DMV failure reports [252] AV failure reports from 12 manufacturers in Califor-
nia11
keep
updating
correctness
ation; One reason might be training and testing machine
learning models have high costs. There is one paper with as
many as 600 datasets, but that paper used these datasets to
evaluate data cleaning techniques, which has relatively low
cost [168].
We also discuss research directions of building dataset
and benchmarks for ML testing in Section 10.
9.5 Open-source Tool Support in ML Testing
There are several tools specially designed for ML testing.
Angell et al. presented Themis [198], an open-source tool
for testing group discrimination12. There is also an ML test-
ing framework for tensorflow, named mltest13, for writing
12 http://fairness.cs.umass.edu/
13 https://github.com/Thenerdstation/mltest
simple ML unit tests. Similar to mltest, there is a testing
framework for writing unit tests for pytorch-based ML sys-
tems, named torchtest14. Dolby et al. [220] extended WALA
to enable static analysis for machine learning code using
TensorFlow.
Overall, unlike traditional testing, the existing tool sup-
port in ML testing is immature. There is still enormous space
for tool-support improvement for ML testing.
10 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
This section discusses the challenges (Section 10.1) and
research opportunities in ML testing (Section 10.2).
14 https://github.com/suriyadeepan/torchtest
27
Table 7: Datasets (3/4): Records for Decision Making
Dataset Description Size Usage
German Credit [253] Descriptions of customers with good and bad credit
risks
1,000 fairness
Adult [254] Census income 48,842 fairness
Bank Marketing [255] Bank client subscription term deposit data 45,211 fairness
US Executions [256] Records of every execution performed in the United
States
1,437 fairness
Fraud Detection [257] European Credit cards transactions 284,807 fairness
Berkeley Admissions
Data [258]
Graduate school applicants to the six largest depart-
ments at University of California, Berkeley in 1973
4,526 fairness
Broward County
COMPAS [259]
Score to determine whether to release a defendant 18,610 fairness
MovieLens Datasets [260] People’s preferences for movies 100k-20m fairness
Zestimate [261] data about homes and Zillow’s in-house price and
predictions
2,990,000 correctness
FICO scores [262] United States credit worthiness 301,536 fairness
Law school success [263] Information concerning law students from 163 law
schools in the United States
21,790 fairness
Table 8: Datasets (4/4): Others
Dataset Description Size Usage
VirusTotal [264] Malicious PDF files 5,000 robustness
Contagio [265] Clean and malicious files 28,760 robustness
Drebin [266] Applications from different malware families 123,453 robustness
Chess [267] Chess game data: King+Rook versus King+Pawn on
a7
3,196 correctness
Waveform [241] CART book’s generated waveform data 5,000 correctness
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Figure 11: Number of papers with different amounts of
datasets in experiments
10.1 Challenges in ML Testing
ML testing has experienced rapid progress. Nevertheless,
ML testing is still at an early stage, with many challenges
and open questions ahead.
Challenges in Test Input Generation. Although a series of
test input generation techniques have been proposed (see
more in Section 5.1), test input generation remains a big
challenge because of the enormous behaviour space of ML
models.
Search-based test generation (SBST) [80] uses a meta-
heuristic optimising search technique, such as a Genetic
Algorithm, to automatically generate test inputs. It is one of
the key automatic test generation techniques in traditional
software interesting. Except for generating test inputs for
testing functional properties like program correctness, SBST
has also been used to explore tensions in algorithmic fair-
ness in requirement analysis. [194], [268]. There exist huge
research opportunities of applying SBST on generating test
inputs for testing ML systems, since SBST has the advantage
of searching test inputs in very large input space.
The existing test input generation techniques focus more
on generating adversarial input to test the robustness of
an ML system. However, adversarial examples are often
arguably criticised that they do not represent the real input
data that could happen in practice. Thus, an interesting
research direction is to how to generate natural test inputs
and how to automatically measure the naturalness of the
generated inputs.
We have seen some related work that tries to gener-
ate test inputs as natural as possible under the scenario
of autonomous driving, such as DeepTest [72], DeepH-
unter [85] and DeepRoad [75], yet the generated images
could still suffer from unnaturalness: sometimes even hu-
man beings could not recognise the generated images by
these tools. It is both interesting and challenging to explore
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whether such kinds of test data that are meaningless to
human beings should be adopted/valid in ML testing.
Challenges on Test Assessment Criteria. There have been a
lot of work exploring how to assess the quality or adequacy
of test data (see more in Section 5.3). However, there is
still a lack of systematic evaluation about how different
assessment metrics correlated with each other, or how these
assessment metrics correlate with the fault-revealing ability
of tests, which has been maturaly studied in traditional
software testing [269].
Challenges in The Oracle Problem. Oracle problem re-
mains a challenge in ML testing. Metamorphic relations
are effective pseudo oracles, but are proposed by human
beings in most cases, and may contain false positives. A
big challenge is thus to automatically identify and construct
reliable test oracles for ML testing.
Murphy et al. [122] discussed that flaky tests are likely
to come up in metamorphic testing whenever floating point
calculations are involved. Flaky test detection is a very
challenging problem in traditional software testing [270]. It
is even more challenging in ML testing because of the oracle
problem.
Even without flaky tests, pseudo oracles may sometimes
be inaccurate, leading to many false positives. There is a
need to explore how to yield more accurate test oracles or
how to reduce the false positives among the reported issues.
We could even use ML algorithm b to learn to detect false-
positive oracles when testing ML algorithm a.
Challenges in Testing Cost Reduction. In traditional soft-
ware testing, the cost problem is a big problem, yield-
ing many cost reduction techniques such as test selection,
test prioritisation, and predicting test execution results. In
ML testing, the cost problem could be even more serious,
especially when testing the ML component, because ML
component testing usually needs retraining of the model
or repeating of the prediction process, as well as data
generation to explore the enormous mode behaviour space.
A possible research direction of reducing cost is to rep-
resent an ML model into some kind of intermediate state to
make it easier for testing.
We could also apply traditional cost reduction tech-
niques such as test prioritisation or test minimisation to
reduce the size of test cases while remaining the test cor-
rectness.
As more and more ML solutions are deployed to diverse
devices and platforms (e.g., mobile device, IoT edge device).
Due to the resource limitation of a target device, how to
effectively test ML model on diverse devices as well as the
deployment process would be also a challenge.
10.2 Research Opportunities in ML testing
There remains many research opportunities in ML testing.
Testing More Application Scenarios. Many current re-
search focuses on supervised learning, in particular the clas-
sification problem. More research works are highly desired
for unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning.
The testing task mostly centres around image classifica-
tion. There are also opportunities in many other areas such
as speech recognition, natural language processing.
Testing More ML Categories and Tasks. We observed
pronounced imbalance regarding the testing on different
machine learning categories and tasks, as demonstrated by
Table 4. There are both challenges and research opportun-
ities for testing unsupervised learning and reinforcement
learning systems.
Transfer learning is gaining popularity recently, which
focuses on storing knowledge gained while solving one
problem and applying it to a different but related prob-
lem [271]. Therefore, transfer learning testing is also import-
ant.
Testing More Properties. From Figure 10, most work test
robustness and correctness, while only less than 3% papers
study efficiency, overfitting detection, or interpretability. We
did not find any papers that systematically test data privacy
violations.
In particular, for testing property interpretability, the
existing approaches still mainly rely on manual assessment,
which check whether human beings could understand the
logic or predictive results of an ML model. It is interesting
to investigate the automatic assessment of interpretability or
detection of interpretability violations.
There has been a discussion that machine learning test-
ing and traditional software testing may have different
requirements in the assurance level towards different prop-
erties [272]. It might also be interesting to explore what
properties are the most important for machine learning
systems, and thus deserve more research and testing efforts.
Presenting More Testing Benchmarks A huge number
of datasets have been adopted in the existing ML testing
papers. Nevertheless, as Tables 5 to 8 show, the datasets
are usually those adopted in building machine learning sys-
tems. As far as we know, there are very few benchmarks like
CleverHans15 that are specially designed for the ML testing
research (i.e., adversarial example construction) purpose.
We hope that in the future, more benchmarks that are
specially designed for ML testing could be presented For
example, a repository of machine learning programs with
real bugs could present a good benchmark for bug-fixing
techniques, like Defects4J16 in traditional software testing.
Testing More Types of Testing Activities. From the in-
troduction in Section 5, as far we know, the requirement
analysis of ML systems is still absent in ML testing. Demon-
strated by Finkelstein et al. [194], [268], a good requirement
analysis may tackle many non-functional properties such as
fairness.
The existing work is mostly about off-line testing.
Online-testing deserves many research efforts as well. Nev-
ertheless, researchers from academia may have limitations
in assessing online models or data, it might be necessary to
cooperate with industry to conduct online testing.
According to the work of Amershi et al. [8], data testing
is especially important and certainly deserves more research
efforts on it. Additionally, there are also many opportunities
for regression testing, bug report analysis, and bug triage in
ML testing.
Due to the black-box nature of machine learning al-
gorithms, ML testing results are often much more difficult,
sometimes even impossible, for developers to understand
than in traditional software testing. Visualisation of testing
15 https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
16 https://github.com/rjust/defects4j
29
results might be particularly helpful in ML testing to help
developers understand the bugs and help with the bug
localisation and repair.
Mutating Investigation in Machine Learning System.
There have been some studies discussing mutating machine
learning code [122], [223], but no work has explored how
to better design mutation operators for machine learning
code so that the mutants could better simulate real-world
machine learning bugs, which we believe could be another
research opportunity.
11 CONCLUSION
We provided a comprehensive overview and analysis of
research work on ML testing. The survey presented the
definitions and current research status of different ML test-
ing properties, testing components, and testing workflow.
It also summarised the datasets used for experiments and
the available open-source testing tools/frameworks, and
analysed the research trend, directions, opportunities, and
challenges in ML testing. We hope this survey could help
software engineering and machine learning researchers get
familiar with the literature research status of ML testing
quickly and thoroughly, and orientate more researchers to
contribute to the pressing problems of ML testing.
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